[1] |
Balder, E. J.: Generalized equilibrium results for games with incomplete information. (1987) · Zbl 0625.49005 |

[2] |
Berry, D. A.; Fristedt, B.: Bandit problems: sequential allocation of experiments. (1985) · Zbl 0659.62086 |

[3] |
Blume, L.; Bray, M.; Easely, D.: Introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium. J. econ. Theory 26, 313-317 (1982) · Zbl 0485.90025 |

[4] |
Easely, D.; Kiefer, N.: Controlling a stochastic process with unknown parameters. Econometrica 56, 1045-1064 (1986) · Zbl 0658.93077 |

[5] |
Feldman, M.: An example of convergence to rational expectations with heterogeneous beliefs. Int. econ. Rev. 28, No. 3, 635-650 (1967) · Zbl 0667.90022 |

[6] |
Fudenberg, D.; Kreps, D.: A theory of learning, experimentation, and equilibrium in games. (1988) |

[7] |
Guillemin, V.; Pollak, A.: Differential topology. (1974) · Zbl 0361.57001 |

[8] |
Harsanyi, J.: The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Int. J. Game theory 4, 61-94 (1975) · Zbl 0319.90078 |

[9] |
Kalai, E.; Lehrer, E.: Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Discussion paper no. 858 (1990) · Zbl 0793.90106 |

[10] |
Marcet, A.; Sargent, T.: Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models. J. econ. Theory 48, 337-368 (1989) · Zbl 0672.90023 |

[11] |
Mclennan, A.: Incomplete learning in a repeated statistical decision problem. (1987) |

[12] |
Milgrom, P.; Roberts, J.: Adaptive and sophisticated learning in repeated normal form games. (1989) · Zbl 0751.90093 |

[13] |
Milgrom, P.; Weber, R.: Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information. Math. oper. Res. 10, 619-632 (1985) · Zbl 0582.90106 |

[14] |
Robinson, J.: An iterative method of solving a game. Ann. math., 296-301 (1951) · Zbl 0045.08203 |

[15] |
Townsend, R.: Market anticipations, rational expectations, and Bayesian analysis. Int. econ. Rev. 19, No. 2, 481-494 (1978) · Zbl 0413.90017 |