Subjective probability versus belief functions in artificial intelligence. (English) Zbl 0795.60002

Summary: We maintain that probability should be preferred with respect to other existing theories as an inferential tool to cope with uncertain knowledge (and not only in the field of Artificial Intelligence). In particular, we discuss probability versus belief functions, by referring to an “abstract” formulation of a classical example. An important aspect is that there is no need to distinguish available evidence from any other possible assumption, which can be looked upon as a potential evidence: if the conditional probability (or Bayesian) approach is set up taking into account all the relevant aspects, i.e. if there is no beforehand given structure on the set of events (which in turns are singled-out by propositions) and if probability is interpreted as degree of belief, then the Bayesian approach leads to very general results that fit (in particular) with those obtained by the belief function model.


60A99 Foundations of probability theory
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