Kuhn, Steven T. Minimal non-contingency logic. (English) Zbl 0833.03005 Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 36, No. 2, 230-234 (1995). Summary: Simple finite axiomatizations are given for versions of the modal logics \({\mathbf K}\) and \({\mathbf K} \mathbf{4}\) with non-contingency (or contingency) as the sole modal primitive. This answers two questions of I. L. Humberstone [posed in the paper reviewed above]. Cited in 1 ReviewCited in 31 Documents MSC: 03B45 Modal logic (including the logic of norms) Keywords:finite axiomatizations; modal logics; non-contingency × Cite Format Result Cite Review PDF Full Text: DOI References: [1] Brogan, A. P., “Aristotle’s logic of statements about contingency,” Mind , vol. 76 (1967), pp. 49–81. [2] Cresswell, M. J., “Necessity and contingency,” Studia Logica , vol. 47 (1988), pp. 145–149. · Zbl 0666.03015 · doi:10.1007/BF00370288 [3] Humberstone, I. L., “The logic of non-contingency,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , vol. 36 (1995), pp. 214–229. · Zbl 0833.03004 · doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040248455 [4] Mortensen, C., “A sequence of normal modal systems with non-contingency bases,” Logique et Analyse , vol. 19 (1976), pp. 341–344. · Zbl 0347.02014 [5] Montgomery, H., and R. Routley, “Contingency and non-contingency bases for normal modal logics,” Logique et Analyse , vol. 9 (1966), pp. 318–328. · Zbl 0294.02008 [6] Montgomery, H., and R. Routley, “Non-contingency axioms for S4 and S5 ,” Logique et Analyse , vol. 9 (1968), pp. 422–428. · Zbl 0169.30003 [7] Montgomery, H., and R. Routley, “Modalities in a sequence of normal non-contingency modal systems,” Logique et Analyse , vol. 12 (1969), pp. 225–227. · Zbl 0196.00902 This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.