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Field on the notion of consistency. (English) Zbl 0883.03002
Summary: Field’s claim that we have a notion of consistency which is neither model-theoretic nor proof-theoretic but primitive, is examined and criticized. His argument is compared to similar examinations by Kreisel and Etchemendy, and Etchemendy’s distinction between interpretational and representational semantics is employed to reveal the flaw in Field’s argument.
03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
Full Text: DOI
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[2] Etchemendy, J., The Concept of Logical Consequence , Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990. · Zbl 0743.03002
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