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Some new results on least square values for TU games. (English) Zbl 0907.90285
Summary: We present some new results concerning the least square family of values for TU games. We first examine the stability of these values from a dynamic point of view and propose a reinterpretation of them from the standpoint of the propensity to disrupt approach. In the second part, the family of individually rational least square (IRLS) values is introduced and an alternative kernel-like formulation of them is provided. Finally, we describe a natural and simple algorithm for calculating any IRLS value of a game.

91A12 Cooperative games
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