# zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

##### Examples
 Geometry Search for the term Geometry in any field. Queries are case-independent. Funct* Wildcard queries are specified by * (e.g. functions, functorial, etc.). Otherwise the search is exact. "Topological group" Phrases (multi-words) should be set in "straight quotation marks". au: Bourbaki & ti: Algebra Search for author and title. The and-operator & is default and can be omitted. Chebyshev | Tschebyscheff The or-operator | allows to search for Chebyshev or Tschebyscheff. "Quasi* map*" py: 1989 The resulting documents have publication year 1989. so: Eur* J* Mat* Soc* cc: 14 Search for publications in a particular source with a Mathematics Subject Classification code (cc) in 14. "Partial diff* eq*" ! elliptic The not-operator ! eliminates all results containing the word elliptic. dt: b & au: Hilbert The document type is set to books; alternatively: j for journal articles, a for book articles. py: 2000-2015 cc: (94A | 11T) Number ranges are accepted. Terms can be grouped within (parentheses). la: chinese Find documents in a given language. ISO 639-1 language codes can also be used.

##### Operators
 a & b logic and a | b logic or !ab logic not abc* right wildcard "ab c" phrase (ab c) parentheses
##### Fields
 any anywhere an internal document identifier au author, editor ai internal author identifier ti title la language so source ab review, abstract py publication year rv reviewer cc MSC code ut uncontrolled term dt document type (j: journal article; b: book; a: book article)
Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project. (English) Zbl 0972.91028
The authors study a model of the dynamic provision of funds to projects that generate public profits. It is described in the form of a discrete-time $n$-person game with the following structure: Each player $i$ chooses an amount $z_i(t)$ as his contribution of private good to a public project in each period $t = 0, 1, \ldots$. Contributions are nonrefundable, and they cannot be made after a fixed contributing horizon $T\leq \infty$. For $t\leq T$ any $z_i(t)$ is feasible, and only $z_i = 0$ is feasible in period $t>T$. At any period $t$, the knowledge of a player $i$ is $(z_i(\tau)$, $Z(\tau))_{\tau=0}^{t-1}$, where $Z(\tau)=\sum_{j=1}^n z_j(\tau)$. The payoff (total benefit) function of a player $i$ depends on the entire sequence contribution of all players, $z = \{z_i(t): 1 \leq i \leq n, t=0,1,\ldots \}$, by the formula: $U_i(z) = f_i(X(T)) - x_i(T)$, where $x_i(T)=\sum_{t\leq T}z_i(t)$, $X(T)=\sum_{i=1}^n x_i(T)$ and each $f_i(X)$ is considered to be a linear function for $X<X^*$ and constant for $X\geq X^*$ with a fixed point $X^*$. For such a game, Nash equilibria, Markov perfect equilibria and perfect Bayesian equilibria are widely discussed in terms of their existence and structure.

##### MSC:
 91A50 Discrete-time games 91A06 $n$-person games, $n>2$ 91A40 Game-theoretic models
Full Text: