×

Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. (English) Zbl 0981.94032

Pfitzmann, Birgit (ed.), Advances in cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001. 20th international conference on theory and application of cryptographic techniques, Innsbruck, Austria, May 6-10, 2001. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2045, 453-474 (2001).
Summary: We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links.
We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 0961.00037].

MSC:

94A62 Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing