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Yi, Byeong-uk

Descending chains and the contextualist approach to semantic paradoxes. (English) Zbl 0989.03012

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 40, No. 4, 554-567 (1999).
Summary: Plausible principles on truth seem to yield contradictory conclusions about paradoxial sentences such as the Strengthened Liar. Those who take the contextualist approach, such as Parsons and Burge, attempt to justify the seemingly contradictory conclusions by arguing that the natural reasoning that leads to them involves some kind of contextual shift that makes them compatible. This paper argues that one cannot take this approach to give a proper treatment of infinite descending chains of semantic attributions. It also examines a related approach taken by Gaifman and argues that it has the same problem.

Cited in 1 Document

MSC:

03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations

Keywords:

paradoxial sentences; contextualist approach; infinite descending chains of semantic attributions
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\textit{B.-u. Yi}, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 40, No. 4, 554--567 (1999; Zbl 0989.03012)
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References:

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[2] Burge, T., “The Liar Paradox: Tangles and chains,” Philosophical Studies , vol. 41 (1982), pp. 367–81.
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