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Cardinality, counting, and equinumerosity. (English) Zbl 1009.03009
Summary: Frege, famously, held that there is a close connection between our concept of cardinal number and the notion of one-one correspondence, a connection enshrined in Hume’s principle. Husserl, and later Parsons, objected that there is no such close connection, that our most primitive conception of cardinality arises from our grasp of the practice of counting. Some empirical work on children’s development of a concept of number has sometimes been thought to point in the same direction. I argue, however, that Frege was close to right, that our concept of cardinal number is closely connected with a notion like that of one-one correspondence, a more primitive notion we might call just as many.

03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03E10 Ordinal and cardinal numbers
00A30 Philosophy of mathematics
Full Text: DOI
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