×

zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games. (English) Zbl 1042.91509

MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
PDF BibTeX XML Cite
Full Text: EuDML Link
References:
[1] W. Albers: Core and kernel-variants based on imputations and demand profiles. Game Theory and Related Fields (O. Moeschlin and D. Pollaschke, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1979. · Zbl 0434.90113
[2] R. J. Aumann, M. Maschler: The bargaining set for cooperative games. Annals of Mathematical Studies (M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley and A. W. Tucker, Princeton 1964, pp. 443-476. · Zbl 0132.14003
[3] E. Bennett: The aspirations approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in side payments games. Internat. J. Game Theory 12 (1983), 29-35.
[4] E. Bennett, W. R. Zame: Bargaining in cooperative games. Internat. J. Game Theory 17 (1988), 279-300. · Zbl 0661.90107
[5] J. Cross: Some theoretic characteristic of economics and political coalitions. J. Conflict Resolution 11 (1967), 184-195.
[6] R. D. McKelvey P. C. Ordeshook, M. D. Winer: The competitive solution for N-person games without transferable utility, with an application to commitee games. The American Political Science Review 72 (1978), 599-615.
[7] A. Stefanescu: Competitive Solutions and Uniform Competitive Solutions for Cooperative Games. Social Science Working Paper No. 868. Institute of Technology, California 1993.
[8] A. Stefanescu: Solutions for transferable utility cooperative games. RAIRO Rech. OpĂ©r. 28 (1994), 369-387. · Zbl 0857.90145
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.