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**Searching for joint gains in multi-party negotiations.**
*(English)*
Zbl 1068.91015

Summary: We develop a constructive approach to multi-party negotiations over continuous issues. The method is intended to be used as a mediator’s tool for step-by-step creation of joint gains in order to reach a Pareto-optimal agreement. During the mediation process, the parties are only required to answer relatively simple questions concerning their preferences; they do not have to reveal their utility functions completely. The method generates jointly improving directions to move along, and it is a non-trivial generalization of the recently proposed two-party methods. We give a mathematical analysis together with a numerical example, but also a practical basis for negotiation support in real-world settings.

### MSC:

91B10 | Group preferences |

90C29 | Multi-objective and goal programming |

91B32 | Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) |

91B76 | Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) |

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\textit{H. Ehtamo} et al., Eur. J. Oper. Res. 130, No. 1, 54--69 (2001; Zbl 1068.91015)

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### References:

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