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A theory of sequential reciprocity. (English) Zbl 1077.91007
Summary: Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. {\it M. Rabin} [Am. Econ. Rev. 83, 1281--1302 (1993)] developed techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept -- sequential reciprocity equilibrium -- for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.

91A18Games in extensive form
Full Text: DOI
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