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Consensus reaching in committees. (English) Zbl 1102.90337

Summary: We apply a consensus model to decision-making in committees that have to choose one or more alternatives from a set of alternatives. The model does not use a voting rule nor a set of winning coalitions. Every decision maker evaluates each alternative with respect to given criteria. The criteria may be of unequal importance to a decision maker. Decision makers may be advised by a chairman to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation of some alternative(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better consensus. The consensus result should satisfy constraints concerning the consensus degree and the majority degree. A simple example is presented.

MSC:

90B50 Management decision making, including multiple objectives

Software:

M-MACBETH
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References:

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