##
**A survey on networking games in telecommunications.**
*(English)*
Zbl 1116.91310

Summary: In this survey, we summarize different modeling and solution concepts of networking games, as well as a number of different applications in telecommunications that make use of or can make use of networking games. We identify some of the mathematical challenges and methodologies that are involved in these problems. We include here work that has relevance to networking games in telecommunications from other areas, in particular from transportation planning.

### MSC:

91A43 | Games involving graphs |

90B18 | Communication networks in operations research |

94A05 | Communication theory |

94C99 | Circuits, networks |

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\textit{E. Altman} et al., Comput. Oper. Res. 33, No. 2, 286--311 (2006; Zbl 1116.91310)

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### References:

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