zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Geometry Search for the term Geometry in any field. Queries are case-independent.
Funct* Wildcard queries are specified by * (e.g. functions, functorial, etc.). Otherwise the search is exact.
"Topological group" Phrases (multi-words) should be set in "straight quotation marks".
au: Bourbaki & ti: Algebra Search for author and title. The and-operator & is default and can be omitted.
Chebyshev | Tschebyscheff The or-operator | allows to search for Chebyshev or Tschebyscheff.
"Quasi* map*" py: 1989 The resulting documents have publication year 1989.
so: Eur* J* Mat* Soc* cc: 14 Search for publications in a particular source with a Mathematics Subject Classification code (cc) in 14.
"Partial diff* eq*" ! elliptic The not-operator ! eliminates all results containing the word elliptic.
dt: b & au: Hilbert The document type is set to books; alternatively: j for journal articles, a for book articles.
py: 2000-2015 cc: (94A | 11T) Number ranges are accepted. Terms can be grouped within (parentheses).
la: chinese Find documents in a given language. ISO 639-1 language codes can also be used.

a & b logic and
a | b logic or
!ab logic not
abc* right wildcard
"ab c" phrase
(ab c) parentheses
any anywhere an internal document identifier
au author, editor ai internal author identifier
ti title la language
so source ab review, abstract
py publication year rv reviewer
cc MSC code ut uncontrolled term
dt document type (j: journal article; b: book; a: book article)
Supply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity-setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods. (English) Zbl 1125.90349
Summary: This paper develops an indirect evolutionary game model with two-vertically integrated channels to study evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) of retailers in the quantity-setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods and analyzes the effects of the demand and raw material supply disruptions on the retailers’ strategies. Every channel consists of one manufacturer and many (a sufficiently large number of) retailers that sell products in different markets by adopting two pure marketing strategies: profit maximization and revenue maximization. We find that revenue maximization strategy may prevail and profit maximization strategy may become extinct. Two strategies may coexist, i.e., all retailers in one channel will choose profit maximization strategy and all retailers in the other will choose revenue maximization strategy. The ESS of retailers depends on the relative size of the market scale and unit cost. The supply chain disruptions affect the ESS of retailers. We also introduce a recovery model of the supply chain under disruptions and illustrate the effect of disruptions on the ESS and on the average profits of channels in a market using a numerical simulation.

90B30Production models
90C59Approximation methods and heuristics
Full Text: DOI
[1] Averyt, W. F.; Ramagopal, K.: Strategic disruption and transaction cost economics: the case of the American auto industry and Japanese competition. International business review 8, 39-53 (1999)
[2] Bester, H.; Güth, W.: Is altruism evolutionarily stable?. Journal of economic behavior and organization 34, 193-209 (1998)
[3] Bischi, G. I.; Kopel, M.: Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations. Journal of economic behavior and organization 46, 73-100 (2001)
[4] Bolle, F.: Is altruism evolutionarily stable. And envy and malevolence?. Journal of economic behavior and organization 42, 131-133 (2000)
[5] Boyaci, T.; Gallego, G.: Coordinating pricing and inventory replenishment policies for one wholesaler and one or more geographically dispersed retailers. International journal of production economics 77, 95-111 (2002)
[6] Cressman, R.: The stability concept of evolutionary game theory. (1992) · Zbl 0763.92006
[7] Friedman, D.: Evolutionary games in economics. Econometrica 59, 637-666 (1991) · Zbl 0745.90012
[8] Friedman, J. W.; Mezzetti, C.: Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations. Journal economic behavior and organization 49, 287-306 (2002)
[9] Groves, T.; Loeb, M.: Incentives in a divisionalized firm. Management science 15, No. 23, 221-230 (1979) · Zbl 0409.90048
[10] Güth, W.; Peleg, B.: When will payoff maximization survive? an indirect evolutionary analysis. Journal of evolutionary economics 11, 479-499 (2001)
[11] Güth, W.; Yaari, M.: An evolutionary approach to explain reciprocal behavior in a simple strategic game. Explaining process and change approaches to evolutionary economics, 23-34 (1992)
[12] Hehenkamp, B.; Qin, C. Z.; Stuart, C.: Economic natural selection in bertrand and cournot setting. Journal of evolutionary economics 9, 211-224 (1999)
[13] Hofbauer, J.; Sigmund, K.: Evolutionary games and population dynamics. (1998) · Zbl 0914.90287
[14] Hosomatsu, Y.: A note on the stability conditions in cournot’s dynamic market solution when neither the actual market demand function nor the production levels of rivals are known. Review of economic studies 36, 117-122 (1969) · Zbl 0181.23108
[15] Huck, S.; Oechssler, J.: The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations. Games and economic behavior 28, 13-24 (1999) · Zbl 0937.91024
[16] Huntington, H. G.: Energy disruptions, inter-firm price effects and the aggregate economy. Energy economics 25, 119-136 (2003)
[17] Jin, J. Y.: Monopolistic competition and bounded rationality. Journal of economic behavior and organization 45, 175-184 (2001)
[18] Kosfeld, M.: Why shops close again: an evolutionary perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours. European economic review 46, 51-72 (2002)
[19] Lewis, E.; Weiler, D. J.: Will the rubber grip the road? an analysis of the US -- Japan automotive agreement. Law and policy in international business 27, No. 3, 631-693 (1996)
[20] Morrison, W. G.: Instincts as reflex choice: does loss of temper have strategic value?. Journal of economic behavior and organization 31, 335-356 (1996)
[21] Qi, X. T.; Bard, J.; Yu, G.: Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions. Omega 32, 301-312 (2004)
[22] Schaffer, M. E.: Are profit-maximizers the best survivors. A Darwinian model of economic natural selection?. Journal of economic behavior and organization 12, 29-45 (1989)
[23] Tanaka, Y.: Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly. Economic theory 14, 705-715 (1999) · Zbl 1037.91546
[24] Tanaka, Y.: Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: equivalence of price and quantity strategies. Journal of mathematical economics 34, 235-253 (2000) · Zbl 0966.91018
[25] Tirole, J.: The theory of industrial organization. (1988) · Zbl 0664.90023
[26] Trimarchi, P.: Transfers, uncertainty and the cost of disruption. International review of law and economics 23, 49-62 (2003)
[27] Ugarte, A.; Oren, S.: Coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high-tech manufacturing organizations (HTMOs). International journal of production economics 67, 235-252 (2000)
[28] Xia, Y.S., Xiao, T.J., Yu, G. 2004a. Production and inventory management with raw material supply disruptions. McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, working paper.
[29] Xia, Y. S.; Yang, M.; Golany, B.; Gilbert, S.; Yu, G.: Real time disruption management in a two-stage production and inventory system. IIE transactions 36, 111-125 (2004)
[30] Xiao, T. J.: Game theory and its applications. (2004)
[31] Xiao, T.J., Yu, G. 2005. Marketing behaviors of retailers with differentiated goods: An evolutionary perspective. Journal of System Science and System Engineering, forthcoming.
[32] Xiao, T. J.; Yu, G.; Sheng, Z. H.; Xia, Y. S.: Coordination of a supply chain with one-manufacturer and two-retailers under demand promotion and disruption management decisions. Annals of operations research 135, 87-109 (2005) · Zbl 1112.90305
[33] Young, H. P.: The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61, 57-84 (1993) · Zbl 0773.90101