Centralised reallocation of emission permits using DEA. (English) Zbl 1179.90190

Summary: A data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach to the problem of emission permits reallocation is presented. It can be used with conventional command and control as well as with an allowance market. It uses a centralized point of view, which represents the common good. In the model it is assumed that firms produce two types of outputs: desirable outputs (i.e. good outputs with positive value for consumers) and undesirable outputs (i.e. bad outputs with negative value for consumers, such as emissions of pollutants). The proposed approach has three phases, which correspond to three objectives that are pursued lexicographically. The three objectives are maximizing aggregated desirable production, minimizing undesirable total emissions and minimizing the consumption of input resources. The relative priority of these objectives is defined by the regulator. The whole approach is units-invariant and does not require information on input and output prices. The approach is applied on a dataset from the Swedish pulp and paper industry.


90B50 Management decision making, including multiple objectives
Full Text: DOI


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