Inclosures, vagueness, and self-reference. (English) Zbl 1198.03034

Priest, Graham

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 51, No. 1, 69-84 (2010).

The author shows that the sorites-type paradoxes can be subsumed under the inclosure schema, discussed, e.g., in his [Beyond the limits of thought. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (1995; Zbl 0851.03001)], in a similar way as this is possible for the self-referential paradoxes of the liar type. Therefore these sorites-type paradoxes allow for a dialetheic solution, i.e.a solution in the context of paraconsistent logic. The basic ideas and the main technical details are clearly explained.

Reviewer: Siegfried J. Gottwald (Leipzig)

MSC:

03B53	Paraconsistent logics
03A05	Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03A10	Logic in the philosophy of science
03B52	Fuzzy logic; logic of vagueness

Keywords:

sorites paradoxes; paradoxes of self-reference; inclosure schema; paraconsistency; vagueness

Citations:

Zbl 0851.03001