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Joint decision on production and pricing for online dual channel supply chain system. (English) Zbl 1201.90106
Summary: Online dual channel supply chain system and its joint decision on production and pricing under information asymmetry are investigated. First, optimal production and pricing strategies are depicted according to the centralized system. Next, two kinds of contracts are designed for the decentralized system to coordinate the channel system, and their production and pricing decisions are depicted using a principle-agent method for the asymmetric information on the traditional channel. Finally, some interesting insights are found: the centralized system is not always being better than the decentralized system with a feasible contract if the traditional and professional retailer has lower selling cost. When uncertainty in the traditional channel information is higher, the manufacturer prefers a menu of contracts according to different channel settings. When uncertainty is lower, the manufacturer prefers a single contract. Furthermore, the higher the uncertainty in the traditional channel, the more the information welfare of the traditional retailer will gain. Performance with a menu of contracts cannot outperform that with a single contract integrating optimistic and pessimistic market setting well; their difference in performance is bigger when uncertainty in the traditional channel information is less.

90B60Marketing, advertising
90B05Inventory, storage, reservoirs
90B06Transportation, logistics
91B38Production theory, theory of the firm (economics)
Full Text: DOI
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