On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games. (English) Zbl 1211.91033

Summary: In this paper I consider the ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for TU cooperative games, i.e., cooperative games for which the preorderings on the set of players induced by these two values coincide. To this end I consider several solution concepts within semivalues and introduce three subclasses of games which are called, respectively, weakly complete, semicoherent and coherent cooperative games. A characterization theorem in terms of the ordinal equivalence of some semivalues is given for each of these three classes of cooperative games. In particular, the Shapley and Banzhaf values as well as the segment of semivalues they limit are ordinally equivalent for weakly complete, semicoherent and coherent cooperative games.


91A12 Cooperative games
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
91B12 Voting theory
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