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A new client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement protocol. (English) Zbl 1248.94103

Chee, Yeow Meng (ed.) et al., Coding and cryptology. Second international workshop, IWCC 2009, Zhangjiajie, China, June 1–5, 2009. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-01813-8/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5557, 63-76 (2009).
Summary: Client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement (C2C-PAKA) protocol deals with the authenticated key agreement process between two clients of different realms, who only share their passwords with their own servers. Recently, J. W. Byun et al. [Inf. Sci. 177, No. 19, 3995–4013 (2007; Zbl 1142.94366)] proposed an efficient C2C-PAKA protocol and carried a claimed proof of security in a formal model of communication and adversarial capabilities. In this paper, we show that the protocol is insecure against password-compromise impersonation attack and the claim of provable security is seriously incorrect. To draw lessons from these results, we revealed fatal flaws in Byun et al.’s security model and their proof of security. Then, we modify formal security model and corresponding security definitions. In addition, a new cross-realm C2C-PAKA protocol is presented with security proof.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1167.94001].

MSC:

94A62 Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing

Citations:

Zbl 1142.94366

Software:

EC2C-PAKA
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Full Text: DOI

References:

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