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Alternative model of fuzzy NTU coalitional game. (English) Zbl 1249.91009
Summary: One of the possible models of fuzzification of non-transferable utility (NTU) coalitional games was extensively treated in [the first author, Fuzzy cooperative games. Cooperation with vague expectations. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag (2001; Zbl 1005.91013)]. In this paper, we suggest an alternative structure of fuzzification of NTU games, where for every coalition, a fuzzy class of (generally crisp) sets of its admissible pay-off vectors is considered. It is shown that this model of a fuzzy coalitional game can be represented by a fuzzy class of deterministic NTU games, and its basic concepts like superadditivity or core can be transparently introduced by means of that class of games.
MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
03E72 Theory of fuzzy sets, etc.
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References:
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