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New results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia-128. (English) Zbl 1267.94082
Jacobson, Michael J. jun. (ed.) et al., Selected areas in cryptography. 16th annual international workshop, SAC 2009, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, August 13–14, 2009. Revised selected papers. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-05443-3/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5867, 281-294 (2009).
Summary: Camellia, a 128-bit block cipher which has been accepted by ISO/IEC as an international standard, is increasingly being used in many cryptographic applications. In this paper, using the redundancy in the key schedule and accelerating the filtration of wrong pairs, we present a new impossible differential attack to reduced-round Camellia. By this attack 12-round Camellia-128 without FL/FL\(^{ - 1}\) functions and whitening is breakable with a total complexity of about \(2^{116.6}\) encryptions and \(2^{116.3}\) chosen plaintexts. In terms of the numbers of the attacked rounds, our attack is better than any previously known attack on Camellia-128.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1177.94012].

94A60 Cryptography
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