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Web and internet economics. 10th international conference, WINE 2014, Beijing, China, December 14–17, 2014. Proceedings. (English) Zbl 1302.68013
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8877. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-319-13128-3/pbk). xiv, 500 p. (2014).

Show indexed articles as search result.

The articles of this volume will be reviewed individually. For the preceding conference see [Zbl 1298.68025].
Indexed articles:
Aziz, Haris; Ye, Chun, Cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations, 1-14 [Zbl 1406.91212]
Abolhassani, Melika; Bateni, Mohammad Hossein; Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Taghi; Mahini, Hamid; Sawant, Anshul, Network Cournot competition, 15-29 [Zbl 1406.91243]
Feldotto, Matthias; Gairing, Martin; Skopalik, Alexander, Bounding the potential function in congestion games and approximate pure Nash equilibria, 30-43 [Zbl 1404.91049]
Cigler, Luděk; Dvořák, Wolfgang; Henzinger, Monika; Starnberger, Martin, Limiting price discrimination when selling products with positive network externalities, 44-57 [Zbl 1406.91142]
Deligkas, Argyrios; Fearnley, John; Savani, Rahul; Spirakis, Paul, Computing approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, 58-71 [Zbl 1404.91008]
Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Kollias, Konstantinos; Roughgarden, Tim, Optimal cost-sharing in weighted congestion games, 72-88 [Zbl 1404.91054]
Chan, Hau; Chen, Jing, Truthful multi-unit procurements with budgets, 89-105 [Zbl 1406.91162]
Bhagat, Smriti; Kim, Anthony; Muthukrishnan, S.; Weinsberg, Udi, The Shapley value in knapsack budgeted games, 106-119 [Zbl 1404.91016]
Kraft, Dennis; Fadaei, Salman; Bichler, Martin, Fast convex decomposition for truthful social welfare approximation, 120-132 [Zbl 1406.91125]
Bousquet, Nicolas; Norin, Sergey; Vetta, Adrian, A near-optimal mechanism for impartial selection, 133-146 [Zbl 1406.91101]
Munagala, Kamesh; Xu, Xiaoming, Value-based network externalities and optimal auction design, 147-160 [Zbl 1406.91187]
Hoefer, Martin; Wagner, Lisa, Matching dynamics with constraints, 161-174 [Zbl 1406.91278]
Filos-Ratsikas, Aris; Miltersen, Peter Bro, Truthful approximations to range voting, 175-188 [Zbl 1406.91105]
Harks, Tobias; Klimm, Max; Peis, Britta, Resource competition on integral polymatroids, 189-202 [Zbl 1406.91218]
Byrka, Jarosław; Sornat, Krzysztof, PTAS for minimax approval voting, 203-217 [Zbl 1406.91102]
Aggarwal, Gagan; Cai, Yang; Mehta, Aranyak; Pierrakos, George, Biobjective online bipartite matching, 218-231 [Zbl 1406.91272]
Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo; Leonardi, Stefano; Sankowski, Piotr; Zhang, Qiang, Revenue maximizing envy-free fixed-price auctions with budgets, 233-246 [Zbl 1406.91166]
Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael; Seeman, Lior, Not just an empty threat: subgame-perfect equilibrium in repeated games played by computationally bounded players, 249-262 [Zbl 1404.91024]
Asadpour, Arash; Bateni, Mohammad Hossein; Bhawalkar, Kshipra; Mirrokni, Vahab, Concise bid optimization strategies with multiple budget constraints, 263-276 [Zbl 1406.91155]
Dughmi, Shaddin; Han, Li; Nisan, Noam, Sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization, 277-291 [Zbl 1406.91171]
Mehta, Ruta; Thain, Nithum; Végh, László A.; Vetta, Adrian, To save or not to save: the Fisher game, 294-307 [Zbl 1406.91240]
Elkind, Edith, Coalitional games on sparse social networks, 308-321 [Zbl 1404.91017]
Goel, Gagan; Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Taghi; Khani, Mohammad Reza, Randomized revenue monotone mechanisms for online advertising, 324-337 [Zbl 1406.91176]
Balcan, Maria-Florina; Daniely, Amit; Mehta, Ruta; Urner, Ruth; Vazirani, Vijay V., Learning economic parameters from revealed preferences, 338-353 [Zbl 1406.91095]
Frongillo, Rafael; Kash, Ian, General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis, 354-370 [Zbl 1404.91005]
Chen, Yiling; Sheffet, Or; Vadhan, Salil, Privacy games, 371-385 [Zbl 1404.91001]
Niazadeh, Rad; Yuan, Yang; Kleinberg, Robert, Simple and near-optimal mechanisms for market intermediation, 386-399 [Zbl 1406.91190]
Cavallo, Ruggiero; Wilkens, Christopher A., GSP with general independent click-through-rates, 400-416 [Zbl 1406.91161]
Hummel, Patrick; McAfee, R. Preston, Position auctions with externalities, 417-422 [Zbl 1406.91181]
Cord-Landwehr, Andreas; Mäcker, Alexander; Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm, Quality of service in network creation games, 423-428 [Zbl 1404.91046]
de Jong, Jasper; Uetz, Marc, The sequential price of anarchy for atomic congestion games, 429-434 [Zbl 1404.91062]
Abshoff, Sebastian; Cord-Landwehr, Andreas; Jung, Daniel; Skopalik, Alexander, Multilevel network games, 435-440 [Zbl 1404.91039]
Apt, Krzysztof R.; Rahn, Mona; Schäfer, Guido; Simon, Sunil, Coordination games on graphs (extended abstract), 441-446 [Zbl 1404.91040]
Barman, Siddharth; Bhaskar, Umang; Echenique, Federico; Wierman, Adam, On the existence of low-rank explanations for mixed strategy behavior, 447-452 [Zbl 1404.91011]
Klimm, Max; Schütz, Andreas, Congestion games with higher demand dimensions, 453-459 [Zbl 1404.91058]
Komiyama, Junpei; Qin, Tao, time-decaying bandits for non-stationary problems, 460-466 [Zbl 1410.91395]
Garg, Jugal, Market equilibrium under piecewise Leontief concave utilities. (Extended abstract), 467-473 [Zbl 1406.91130]
Fang, Qizhi; Li, Bo; Sun, Xiaoming; Zhang, Jia; Zhang, Jialin, Computing the least-core and nucleolus for threshold cardinality matching games, 474-479 [Zbl 1404.91018]
Gairing, Martin; Kotsialou, Grammateia; Skopalik, Alexander, Approximate pure Nash equilibria in social context congestion games, 480-485 [Zbl 1404.91053]
Bilò, Vittorio; Fanelli, Angelo; Flammini, Michele; Monaco, Gianpiero; Moscardelli, Luca, Nash stability in fractional hedonic games, 486-491 [Zbl 1404.91012]
Das, Sanmay; Li, Zhuoshu, The role of common and private signals in two-sided matching with interviews, 492-497 [Zbl 1406.91277]

68-06 Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to computer science
91-06 Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
68M11 Internet topics
00B25 Proceedings of conferences of miscellaneous specific interest
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