Maas, Alexander; Goemans, Christopher; Manning, Dale; Kroll, Stephan; Brown, Thomas Dilemmas, coordination and defection: how uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction. (English) Zbl 1393.91036 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 760-774 (2017). MSC: 91A90 91B18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Maas} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 760--774 (2017; Zbl 1393.91036) Full Text: DOI
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. (English) Zbl 1393.91002 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 744-759 (2017). MSC: 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Bergemann} and \textit{S. Morris}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 744--759 (2017; Zbl 1393.91002) Full Text: DOI
Arechar, Antonio A.; Dreber, Anna; Fudenberg, Drew; Rand, David G. “I’m just a soul whose intentions are good”: the role of communication in noisy repeated games. (English) Zbl 1393.91018 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 726-743 (2017). MSC: 91A28 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. A. Arechar} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 726--743 (2017; Zbl 1393.91018) Full Text: DOI
Kusterer, David J.; Schmitz, Patrick W. The management of innovation: experimental evidence. (English) Zbl 1393.91104 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 706-725 (2017). MSC: 91B38 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. J. Kusterer} and \textit{P. W. Schmitz}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 706--725 (2017; Zbl 1393.91104) Full Text: DOI
Dato, Simon; Grunewald, Andreas; Müller, Daniel; Strack, Philipp Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction. (English) Zbl 1393.91003 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 681-705 (2017). MSC: 91A10 91A30 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Dato} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 681--705 (2017; Zbl 1393.91003) Full Text: DOI
Brandl, Florian The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games. (English) Zbl 1393.91001 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 674-680 (2017). MSC: 91A05 91A15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Brandl}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 674--680 (2017; Zbl 1393.91001) Full Text: DOI
Kuzmics, Christoph Abraham Wald’s complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty. (English) Zbl 1393.91040 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 666-673 (2017). MSC: 91B06 91B16 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Kuzmics}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 666--673 (2017; Zbl 1393.91040) Full Text: DOI
Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz Some further properties of the cumulative offer process. (English) Zbl 1393.91115 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 656-665 (2017). MSC: 91B68 91B40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. O. Afacan}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 656--665 (2017; Zbl 1393.91115) Full Text: DOI
Rosar, Frank Test design under voluntary participation. (English) Zbl 1393.91024 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 632-655 (2017). MSC: 91A28 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Rosar}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 632--655 (2017; Zbl 1393.91024) Full Text: DOI
Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents. (English) Zbl 1393.91058 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 613-631 (2017). MSC: 91B14 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Mukherjee} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 613--631 (2017; Zbl 1393.91058) Full Text: DOI
Garrett, Daniel F. Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values. (English) Zbl 1393.91080 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 595-612 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. F. Garrett}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 595--612 (2017; Zbl 1393.91080) Full Text: DOI
Leduc, Matt V.; Jackson, Matthew O.; Johari, Ramesh Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks. (English) Zbl 1393.91069 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 568-594 (2017). MSC: 91B24 91A25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. V. Leduc} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 568--594 (2017; Zbl 1393.91069) Full Text: DOI
Li, Jiangtao; Tang, Rui Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable. (English) Zbl 1393.91042 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 563-567 (2017). MSC: 91B08 91A18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Li} and \textit{R. Tang}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 563--567 (2017; Zbl 1393.91042) Full Text: DOI
Sanjurjo, Adam Search with multiple attributes: theory and empirics. (English) Zbl 1393.91107 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 535-562 (2017). MSC: 91B40 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Sanjurjo}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 535--562 (2017; Zbl 1393.91107) Full Text: DOI
Newton, Jonathan Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration. (English) Zbl 1393.91012 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 517-534 (2017). MSC: 91A22 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Newton}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 517--534 (2017; Zbl 1393.91012) Full Text: DOI
Bose, Subir; Daripa, Arup Shills and snipes. (English) Zbl 1393.91074 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 507-516 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bose} and \textit{A. Daripa}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 507--516 (2017; Zbl 1393.91074) Full Text: DOI
Buisseret, Peter Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules. (English) Zbl 1393.91046 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 494-506 (2017). MSC: 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Buisseret}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 494--506 (2017; Zbl 1393.91046) Full Text: DOI
Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Sang-Hyun “Small, yet beautiful”: reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests. (English) Zbl 1393.91076 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 486-493 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. M. Chowdhury} and \textit{S.-H. Kim}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 486--493 (2017; Zbl 1393.91076) Full Text: DOI
Kwiek, Maksymilian Efficient voting with penalties. (English) Zbl 1393.91049 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 468-485 (2017). MSC: 91B12 91B14 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Kwiek}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 468--485 (2017; Zbl 1393.91049) Full Text: DOI
Ben-Zwi, Oren Walrasian’s characterization and a universal ascending auction. (English) Zbl 1393.91073 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 456-467 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Ben-Zwi}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 456--467 (2017; Zbl 1393.91073) Full Text: DOI
Gelder, Alan; Kovenock, Dan Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests. (English) Zbl 1393.91081 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 444-455 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Gelder} and \textit{D. Kovenock}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 444--455 (2017; Zbl 1393.91081) Full Text: DOI
Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a ‘state of the art’ model. (English) Zbl 1393.91051 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 430-443 (2017). MSC: 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Midjord} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 430--443 (2017; Zbl 1393.91051) Full Text: DOI
Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces. (English) Zbl 1393.91020 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 411-429 (2017). MSC: 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Gentzkow} and \textit{E. Kamenica}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 411--429 (2017; Zbl 1393.91020) Full Text: DOI
Arieli, Itai Payoff externalities and social learning. (English) Zbl 1393.91014 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 392-410 (2017). MSC: 91A26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Arieli}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 392--410 (2017; Zbl 1393.91014) Full Text: DOI
Häfner, Samuel A tug-of-war team contest. (English) Zbl 1393.91082 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 372-391 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Häfner}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 372--391 (2017; Zbl 1393.91082) Full Text: DOI
Kim, Semin Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach. (English) Zbl 1393.91056 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 350-371 (2017). MSC: 91B14 91B12 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Kim}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 350--371 (2017; Zbl 1393.91056) Full Text: DOI
Renault, Jérôme; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas Optimal dynamic information provision. (English) Zbl 1393.91110 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 329-349 (2017). MSC: 91B44 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Renault} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 329--349 (2017; Zbl 1393.91110) Full Text: DOI arXiv
Perea, Andrés; Roy, Souvik A new epistemic characterization of \(\varepsilon\)-proper rationalizability. (English) Zbl 1393.91017 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 309-328 (2017). MSC: 91A26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Perea} and \textit{S. Roy}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 309--328 (2017; Zbl 1393.91017) Full Text: DOI
Gradwohl, Ronen; Smorodinsky, Rann Perception games and privacy. (English) Zbl 1393.91021 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 293-308 (2017). MSC: 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Gradwohl} and \textit{R. Smorodinsky}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 293--308 (2017; Zbl 1393.91021) Full Text: DOI
Kellner, Christian; Le Quement, Mark T. Modes of ambiguous communication. (English) Zbl 1393.91022 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 271-292 (2017). MSC: 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Kellner} and \textit{M. T. Le Quement}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 271--292 (2017; Zbl 1393.91022) Full Text: DOI
Hinnosaar, Toomas Calendar mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1393.91084 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 252-270 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Hinnosaar}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 252--270 (2017; Zbl 1393.91084) Full Text: DOI
Laslier, Jean-François; Núñez, Matías; Pimienta, Carlos Reaching consensus through approval bargaining. (English) Zbl 1393.91057 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 241-251 (2017). MSC: 91B14 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-F. Laslier} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 241--251 (2017; Zbl 1393.91057) Full Text: DOI
Kumano, Taro Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities. (English) Zbl 1393.91122 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 230-240 (2017). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Kumano}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 230--240 (2017; Zbl 1393.91122) Full Text: DOI
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability. (English) Zbl 1393.91121 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 222-229 (2017). MSC: 91B68 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Klaus} and \textit{F. Klijn}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 222--229 (2017; Zbl 1393.91121) Full Text: DOI
Mengel, Friederike; Rivas, Javier Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments. (English) Zbl 1393.91050 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 190-221 (2017). MSC: 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Mengel} and \textit{J. Rivas}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 190--221 (2017; Zbl 1393.91050) Full Text: DOI
Jelnov, Artyom; Tauman, Yair; Zeckhauser, Richard Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction. (English) Zbl 1393.91025 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 177-189 (2017). MSC: 91A80 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Jelnov} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 177--189 (2017; Zbl 1393.91025) Full Text: DOI
Platz, Trine Tornøe; Østerdal, Lars Peter The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline. (English) Zbl 1394.90203 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 165-176 (2017). MSC: 90B22 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. T. Platz} and \textit{L. P. Østerdal}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 165--176 (2017; Zbl 1394.90203) Full Text: DOI
Bjorndahl, A.; Halpern, J. Y.; Pass, R. Reasoning about rationality. (English) Zbl 1393.91015 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 146-164 (2017). MSC: 91A26 91A35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Bjorndahl} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 104, 146--164 (2017; Zbl 1393.91015) Full Text: DOI
Martin, Daniel Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality. (English) Zbl 1393.91070 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 131-145 (2017). MSC: 91B24 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Martin}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 131--145 (2017; Zbl 1393.91070) Full Text: DOI
Neyman, Abraham Continuous-time stochastic games. (English) Zbl 1393.91008 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 92-130 (2017). MSC: 91A15 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Neyman}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 92--130 (2017; Zbl 1393.91008) Full Text: DOI
Lu, Jingfeng; Parreiras, Sérgio O. Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux. (English) Zbl 1393.91089 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 78-91 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Lu} and \textit{S. O. Parreiras}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 78--91 (2017; Zbl 1393.91089) Full Text: DOI
Manea, Mihai Bargaining in dynamic markets. (English) Zbl 1393.91090 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 59-77 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91A40 91B50 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Manea}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 59--77 (2017; Zbl 1393.91090) Full Text: DOI
Klaus, Bettina Consistency and its converse for roommate markets. (English) Zbl 1393.91120 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 43-58 (2017). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Klaus}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 43--58 (2017; Zbl 1393.91120) Full Text: DOI
Bracha, Anat; Vesterlund, Lise Mixed signals: charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income. (English) Zbl 1393.91026 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 24-42 (2017). MSC: 91A90 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Bracha} and \textit{L. Vesterlund}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 24--42 (2017; Zbl 1393.91026) Full Text: DOI
Charness, Gary; Dave, Chetan Confirmation bias with motivated beliefs. (English) Zbl 1393.91027 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 1-23 (2017). MSC: 91A90 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Charness} and \textit{C. Dave}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 1--23 (2017; Zbl 1393.91027) Full Text: DOI