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Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents. (English) Zbl 1393.91058

Summary: We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete characterization of the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable when agents are partially honest, in the sense that they have strict preferences for being sincere when truthfulness does not result in a worse outcome. As an application, we show that the Pareto correspondence is implemented by a finite mechanism.

MSC:

91B14 Social choice
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
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