White, Halbert; Xu, Haiqing; Chalak, Karim Causal discourse in a game of incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1311.91124 J. Econom. 182, No. 1, 45-58 (2014). Summary: Notions of cause and effect are fundamental to economic explanation. Although concepts such as price effects are intuitive, rigorous foundations justifying causal discourse in the wide range of economic settings remain lacking. We illustrate this deficiency using an \(N\)-bidder private-value auction, posing causal questions that cannot be addressed within existing frameworks. We extend the frameworks of J. Pearl [Causality. Models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2000; Zbl 0959.68116)] and H. White and K. Chalak [J. Mach. Learn. Res. 10, 1759–1799 (2009; Zbl 1235.91148)] to introduce topological settable systems (TSS), a causal framework capable of delivering the missing answers. Particularly, TSS accommodate choices belonging to general function spaces. Our analysis suggests how TSS enable causal discourse in various areas of economics. Cited in 3 Documents MSC: 91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models 60B05 Probability measures on topological spaces 91A40 Other game-theoretic models Keywords:auction; causality; game of incomplete information; simultaneous equations; structural equations Citations:Zbl 0959.68116; Zbl 1235.91148 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{H. White} et al., J. Econom. 182, No. 1, 45--58 (2014; Zbl 1311.91124) Full Text: DOI References: [1] Aliprantis, C.; Border, K., Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker’s Guide (2006), Springer Verlag: Springer Verlag Berlin · Zbl 1156.46001 [2] Anderson, R.; Bing, R., A complete elementary proof that Hilbert space is homeomorphic to the countable infinite product of real lines, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 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