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Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games. (English) Zbl 0778.90088

Summary: It is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for a bimatrix game resembles the structure of the set of (perfect) Nash equilibria. Maximal Pareto subsets are introduced to take over the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found that the set of Pareto equilibria is the finite union of maximal Pareto subsets. By extending the dimension relation for maximal Nash subsets to faces of such sets, a dimension relation for maximal Pareto subsets is derived. Finally, some remarks are made on the structure of the sets of proper and persistent equilibria.

MSC:

91A05 2-person games
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References:

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