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On organization of markets of homogeneous goods. (English. Russian original) Zbl 1272.91058

J. Comput. Syst. Sci. Int. 46, No. 1, 93-106 (2007); translation from Izv. Ross. Akad. Nauk, Teor. Sist. Upr. 2007, No. 1, 98-112 (2007).
Summary: Different supply function auctions in a market of homogeneous good are considered. The problems of the unique existence and computation of a Nash equilibrium are studied for these models. Estimates of the Nash equilibrium deviation from the competitive equilibrium are obtained for each case. For a first-price auction different indexes of the “market power” are investigated as applied to the electricity market. It is shown that the ordinary criteria of competitive behavior are too gentle for this market. Stronger conditions are formulated that provide sufficiently small deviation of the market price from the competitive equilibrium price. The problem of optimal organization of an auction is discussed from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The obtained results are applied to the analysis of the electricity market in Russia.

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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