## No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution.(English)Zbl 1471.91191

Summary: A bargaining solution satisfies no individual priorities (NIP) if the following holds: if $$x$$ is the selected utility allocation and $$\pi x$$ is also feasible, where $$\pi$$ is some permutation, then $$x=\pi x$$. I characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the basis of this axiom, non-triviality (the disagreement point is never selected), and scale covariance. An additional characterization is presented for the 2-person case, in which NIP is weakened and symmetry is added.

### MSC:

 91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Full Text:

### References:

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