An axiomatic version of Fitch’s paradox.

*(English)*Zbl 1284.03141Summary: A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the paradox.

##### MSC:

03B42 | Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) |

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##### References:

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