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Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge? (English) Zbl 1328.91013
Summary: This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.

91A10 Noncooperative games
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
94A99 Communication, information
Full Text: DOI
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