Sobel, Joel Signaling games. (English) Zbl 1454.91041 Sotomayor, Marilda (ed.) et al., Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. Encycl. Complex. Syst. Sci. Ser., 251-268 (2020). MSC: 91A28 91A05 91A27 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Sobel}, in: Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. 251--268 (2020; Zbl 1454.91041) Full Text: DOI
Gradwohl, Ronen; Smorodinsky, Rann Perception games and privacy. (English) Zbl 1393.91021 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 293-308 (2017). MSC: 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Gradwohl} and \textit{R. Smorodinsky}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 293--308 (2017; Zbl 1393.91021) Full Text: DOI
Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies. (English) Zbl 1282.91062 J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 2, 656-671 (2011). MSC: 91A28 91B44 91A18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. B. Stinchcombe}, J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 2, 656--671 (2011; Zbl 1282.91062) Full Text: DOI
Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies. (English) Zbl 1282.91042 J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 2, 638-655 (2011). MSC: 91A18 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. B. Stinchcombe}, J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 2, 638--655 (2011; Zbl 1282.91042) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Ying Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers. (English) Zbl 1282.91059 J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 2, 401-424 (2011). MSC: 91A28 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Chen}, J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 2, 401--424 (2011; Zbl 1282.91059) Full Text: DOI
Kartik, Navin; Ottaviani, Marco; Squintani, Francesco Credulity, lies, and costly talk. (English) Zbl 1156.91322 J. Econ. Theory 134, No. 1, 93-116 (2007). MSC: 91A28 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Kartik} et al., J. Econ. Theory 134, No. 1, 93--116 (2007; Zbl 1156.91322) Full Text: DOI
Ottaviani, Marco; Squintani, Francesco Naive audience and communication bias. (English) Zbl 1118.91027 Int. J. Game Theory 35, No. 1, 129-150 (2006). MSC: 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Ottaviani} and \textit{F. Squintani}, Int. J. Game Theory 35, No. 1, 129--150 (2006; Zbl 1118.91027) Full Text: DOI
Gerardi, Dino Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1059.91008 J. Econ. Theory 114, No. 1, 104-131 (2004). MSC: 91A18 91A28 91A10 91B52 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Gerardi}, J. Econ. Theory 114, No. 1, 104--131 (2004; Zbl 1059.91008) Full Text: DOI
Ma, C. Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information. (English) Zbl 1006.91014 J. Econ. Dyn. Control 24, No. 3, 451-482 (2000). MSC: 91A18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Ma}, J. Econ. Dyn. Control 24, No. 3, 451--482 (2000; Zbl 1006.91014) Full Text: DOI
Manelli, Alejandro M. A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games. (English) Zbl 0887.90195 J. Econ. Theory 74, No. 1, 152-173 (1997). MSC: 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. M. Manelli}, J. Econ. Theory 74, No. 1, 152--173 (1997; Zbl 0887.90195) Full Text: DOI
Perea y Monsuwé, Andres; Jansen, Mathijs; Peters, Hans Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games. (English) Zbl 0880.90140 J. Math. Econ. 27, No. 4, 425-449 (1997). MSC: 91A05 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Perea y Monsuwé} et al., J. Math. Econ. 27, No. 4, 425--449 (1997; Zbl 0880.90140) Full Text: DOI
Hellwig, Martin F. Sequential decisions under uncertainty and the maximum theorem. (English) Zbl 0870.90006 J. Math. Econ. 25, No. 4, 443-464 (1996). MSC: 91B06 90C39 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. F. Hellwig}, J. Math. Econ. 25, No. 4, 443--464 (1996; Zbl 0870.90006) Full Text: DOI
Manelli, Alejandro M. The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games. (English) Zbl 0852.90134 Econ. Theory 7, No. 2, 323-335 (1996). MSC: 91A05 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. M. Manelli}, Econ. Theory 7, No. 2, 323--335 (1996; Zbl 0852.90134) Full Text: DOI