Garcia, Daniel; Tsur, Matan Information design in competitive insurance markets. (English) Zbl 07314467 J. Econ. Theory 191, Article ID 105160, 19 p. (2021). MSC: 91G05 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Garcia} and \textit{M. Tsur}, J. Econ. Theory 191, Article ID 105160, 19 p. (2021; Zbl 07314467) Full Text: DOI
Goldstein, Itay; Leitner, Yaron Stress tests and information disclosure. (English) Zbl 1417.91323 J. Econ. Theory 177, 34-69 (2018). MSC: 91B44 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Goldstein} and \textit{Y. Leitner}, J. Econ. Theory 177, 34--69 (2018; Zbl 1417.91323) Full Text: DOI
Chillemi, Ottorino; Gui, Benedetto; Rocco, Lorenzo Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation. (English) Zbl 1415.91040 Int. J. Game Theory 46, No. 3, 737-760 (2017). MSC: 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Chillemi} et al., Int. J. Game Theory 46, No. 3, 737--760 (2017; Zbl 1415.91040) Full Text: DOI
Acemoglu, Daron; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asuman Privacy-constrained network formation. (English) Zbl 1415.91232 Games Econ. Behav. 105, 255-275 (2017). MSC: 91D30 91A43 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Acemoglu} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 105, 255--275 (2017; Zbl 1415.91232) Full Text: DOI
Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning. (English) Zbl 1400.91230 J. Econ. Theory 171, 174-212 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Nikandrova} and \textit{R. Pancs}, J. Econ. Theory 171, 174--212 (2017; Zbl 1400.91230) Full Text: DOI
Rosar, Frank Test design under voluntary participation. (English) Zbl 1393.91024 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 632-655 (2017). MSC: 91A28 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Rosar}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 632--655 (2017; Zbl 1393.91024) Full Text: DOI
Gradwohl, Ronen; Smorodinsky, Rann Perception games and privacy. (English) Zbl 1393.91021 Games Econ. Behav. 104, 293-308 (2017). MSC: 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Gradwohl} and \textit{R. Smorodinsky}, Games Econ. Behav. 104, 293--308 (2017; Zbl 1393.91021) Full Text: DOI
Hwang, Ilwoo; Li, Fei Transparency of outside options in bargaining. (English) Zbl 1400.91221 J. Econ. Theory 167, 116-147 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91A25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Hwang} and \textit{F. Li}, J. Econ. Theory 167, 116--147 (2017; Zbl 1400.91221) Full Text: DOI
Troya-Martinez, Marta Vagueness and information-sharing. (English) Zbl 1394.91266 Games Econ. Behav. 100, 301-320 (2016). MSC: 91B44 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Troya-Martinez}, Games Econ. Behav. 100, 301--320 (2016; Zbl 1394.91266) Full Text: DOI
Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim Sequential information disclosure in auctions. (English) Zbl 1330.91089 J. Econ. Theory 159, Part B, 1074-1095 (2015). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Bergemann} and \textit{A. Wambach}, J. Econ. Theory 159, Part B, 1074--1095 (2015; Zbl 1330.91089) Full Text: DOI
Skreta, Vasiliki Optimal auction design under non-commitment. (English) Zbl 1330.91103 J. Econ. Theory 159, Part B, 854-890 (2015). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Skreta}, J. Econ. Theory 159, Part B, 854--890 (2015; Zbl 1330.91103) Full Text: DOI
Bergemann, Dirk; Pavan, Alessandro Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1330.91005 J. Econ. Theory 159, Part B, 679-701 (2015). MSC: 91-06 91B26 00B25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Bergemann} and \textit{A. Pavan}, J. Econ. Theory 159, Part B, 679--701 (2015; Zbl 1330.91005) Full Text: DOI
Ghosh, Arpita; Roth, Aaron Selling privacy at auction. (English) Zbl 1318.91093 Games Econ. Behav. 91, 334-346 (2015). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Ghosh} and \textit{A. Roth}, Games Econ. Behav. 91, 334--346 (2015; Zbl 1318.91093) Full Text: DOI
Pancs, Romans Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition. (English) Zbl 1283.91080 Games Econ. Behav. 82, 522-543 (2013). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Pancs}, Games Econ. Behav. 82, 522--543 (2013; Zbl 1283.91080) Full Text: DOI
Piccolo, Salvatore; Pagnozzi, Marco Information sharing between vertical hierarchies. (English) Zbl 1281.91115 Games Econ. Behav. 79, 201-222 (2013). MSC: 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Piccolo} and \textit{M. Pagnozzi}, Games Econ. Behav. 79, 201--222 (2013; Zbl 1281.91115) Full Text: DOI
Said, Maher Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization. (English) Zbl 1260.91113 J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 6, 2419-2438 (2012). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Said}, J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 6, 2419--2438 (2012; Zbl 1260.91113) Full Text: DOI
Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations. (English) Zbl 1239.91067 Games Econ. Behav. 75, No. 2, 714-730 (2012). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Krasteva} and \textit{H. Yildirim}, Games Econ. Behav. 75, No. 2, 714--730 (2012; Zbl 1239.91067) Full Text: DOI
Rasul, Imran; Sonderegger, Silvia The role of the agent’s outside options in principal-agent relationships. (English) Zbl 1200.91168 Games Econ. Behav. 68, No. 2, 781-788 (2010). MSC: 91B40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Rasul} and \textit{S. Sonderegger}, Games Econ. Behav. 68, No. 2, 781--788 (2010; Zbl 1200.91168) Full Text: DOI
Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo Sequential contracting with multiple principals. (English) Zbl 1159.91009 J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 2, 503-531 (2009). MSC: 91A25 91A10 91B40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Pavan} and \textit{G. Calzolari}, J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 2, 503--531 (2009; Zbl 1159.91009) Full Text: DOI