Konstantopoulos, Takis; Yuan, Linglong Does the ratio of Laplace transforms of powers of a function identify the function? (English) Zbl 07309682 J. Math. Anal. Appl. 494, No. 1, Article ID 124568, 12 p. (2021). MSC: 60 62 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Konstantopoulos} and \textit{L. Yuan}, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 494, No. 1, Article ID 124568, 12 p. (2021; Zbl 07309682) Full Text: DOI
Pesendorfer, Martin Auctions. (English) Zbl 07309874 Sotomayor, Marilda (ed.) et al., Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer (ISBN 978-1-0716-0367-3/print; 978-1-0716-0368-0/ebook; 978-1-0716-0369-7/print+ebook). Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series; Springer Reference, 335-348 (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Pesendorfer}, in: Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. 335--348 (2020; Zbl 07309874) Full Text: DOI
Lavi, Ron Mechanism design. (English) Zbl 07309873 Sotomayor, Marilda (ed.) et al., Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer (ISBN 978-1-0716-0367-3/print; 978-1-0716-0368-0/ebook; 978-1-0716-0369-7/print+ebook). Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series; Springer Reference, 317-333 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Lavi}, in: Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. 317--333 (2020; Zbl 07309873) Full Text: DOI
Li, Ao; Wan, Zhaoman; Wan, Zhong Optimal design of online sequential buy-price auctions with consumer valuation learning. (English) Zbl 07309466 Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 37, No. 3, Article ID 2050012, 26 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 90C39 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Li} et al., Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 37, No. 3, Article ID 2050012, 26 p. (2020; Zbl 07309466) Full Text: DOI
Ma, Benjiang; Zhou, Zhongmin; Bashir, Muhammad Farhan; Huang, Yuanji A multi-attribute reverse auction model on margin bidding. (English) Zbl 07309392 Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 37, No. 6, Article ID 2050032, 21 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Ma} et al., Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 37, No. 6, Article ID 2050032, 21 p. (2020; Zbl 07309392) Full Text: DOI
Gimenes, Nathalie; Guerre, Emmanuel Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids. (English) Zbl 07308433 J. Econom. 219, No. 1, 1-18 (2020). MSC: 62 91 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Gimenes} and \textit{E. Guerre}, J. Econom. 219, No. 1, 1--18 (2020; Zbl 07308433) Full Text: DOI
Kongo, Takumi Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions. (English) Zbl 07297161 Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 3-4, 199-213 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91A12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Kongo}, Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 3--4, 199--213 (2020; Zbl 07297161) Full Text: DOI
Onderstal, Sander Premium auctions in the field. (English) Zbl 07297154 Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 1-2, 39-63 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91-05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Onderstal}, Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 1--2, 39--63 (2020; Zbl 07297154) Full Text: DOI
Bichler, Martin; Hao, Zhen; Littmann, Richard; Waldherr, Stefan Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement. (English) Zbl 07285019 OR Spectrum 42, No. 4, 965-994 (2020). MSC: 90B80 90B10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Bichler} et al., OR Spectrum 42, No. 4, 965--994 (2020; Zbl 07285019) Full Text: DOI
Derksen, M.; Kleijn, B.; de Vilder, R. Clearing price distributions in call auctions. (English) Zbl 07282789 Quant. Finance 20, No. 9, 1475-1493 (2020). MSC: 91G20 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Derksen} et al., Quant. Finance 20, No. 9, 1475--1493 (2020; Zbl 07282789) Full Text: DOI
Abraham, Ittai; Athey, Susan; Babaioff, Moshe; Grubb, Michael D. Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information. (English) Zbl 1452.91156 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 454-477 (2020). MSC: 91B26 90B60 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Abraham} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 124, 454--477 (2020; Zbl 1452.91156) Full Text: DOI
Babaioff, Moshe; Immorlica, Nicole; Lucier, Brendan; Weinberg, S. Matthew A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. (English) Zbl 07273095 J. ACM 67, No. 4, Article No. 24, 40 p. (2020). MSC: 68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Babaioff} et al., J. ACM 67, No. 4, Article No. 24, 40 p. (2020; Zbl 07273095) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Shaogang; Dai, Zenggang Decision-making model of bidding based on eBay. (Chinese. English summary) Zbl 07267165 J. Syst. Eng. 35, No. 2, 201-209 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Chen} and \textit{Z. Dai}, J. Syst. Eng. 35, No. 2, 201--209 (2020; Zbl 07267165) Full Text: DOI
Goel, Gagan; Mirrokni, Vahab; Paes Leme, Renato Clinching auctions with online supply. (English) Zbl 1452.91161 Games Econ. Behav. 123, 342-358 (2020). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Goel} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 123, 342--358 (2020; Zbl 1452.91161) Full Text: DOI
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig Strictly strategy-proof auctions. (English) Zbl 1450.91014 Math. Soc. Sci. 107, 13-16 (2020). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Escudé} and \textit{L. Sinander}, Math. Soc. Sci. 107, 13--16 (2020; Zbl 1450.91014) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yaonan; Lu, Pinyan; Tang, Zhihao Gavin; Xiao, Tao Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms. (English) Zbl 07248600 SIAM J. Comput. 49, No. 5, 927-958 (2020). MSC: 65K05 68W40 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., SIAM J. Comput. 49, No. 5, 927--958 (2020; Zbl 07248600) Full Text: DOI
Xie, Shu-Cui; Xue, Man-Mang; Zhang, Jian-Zhong Cryptanalysis and improvement of multiparty quantum sealed-bid auction. (English) Zbl 1448.81295 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 59, No. 8, 2354-2361 (2020). MSC: 81P94 81P45 81P40 81V80 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S.-C. Xie} et al., Int. J. Theor. Phys. 59, No. 8, 2354--2361 (2020; Zbl 1448.81295) Full Text: DOI
Sun, Jiasen; Li, Guo Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits. (English) Zbl 1447.91076 Ann. Oper. Res. 291, No. 1-2, 847-874 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B76 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Sun} and \textit{G. Li}, Ann. Oper. Res. 291, No. 1--2, 847--874 (2020; Zbl 1447.91076) Full Text: DOI
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. (English) Zbl 1447.91036 J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105036, 29 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B24 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Kazumura} et al., J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105036, 29 p. (2020; Zbl 1447.91036) Full Text: DOI
Kotowski, Maciej H. First-price auctions with budget constraints. (English) Zbl 1445.91022 Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 199-237 (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. H. Kotowski}, Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 199--237 (2020; Zbl 1445.91022) Full Text: DOI
Umbhauer, Gisèle Second-price all-pay auctions and best-reply matching equilibria. (English) Zbl 07224035 Petrosyan, Leon A. (ed.) et al., Game theoretic analysis. Part. 1. Non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis. Part 2. Cooperative games and axiomatic values. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific (ISBN 978-981-12-0200-1/hbk; 978-981-12-0202-5/ebook). 163-202 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B68 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Umbhauer}, in: Game theoretic analysis. Part. 1. Non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis. Part 2. Cooperative games and axiomatic values. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific. 163--202 (2020; Zbl 07224035) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Bo Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry. (English) Zbl 1442.91042 Econ. Lett. 191, Article ID 109122, 4 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Chen}, Econ. Lett. 191, Article ID 109122, 4 p. (2020; Zbl 1442.91042) Full Text: DOI
Shi, Run-hua; Zhang, Rui; Liu, Bai; Zhang, Mingwu Cryptanalysis and improvement of quantum sealed-bid auction. (English) Zbl 1441.81038 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 59, No. 6, 1917-1926 (2020). MSC: 81P45 81P94 81P70 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R.-h. Shi} et al., Int. J. Theor. Phys. 59, No. 6, 1917--1926 (2020; Zbl 1441.81038) Full Text: DOI
Enache, Andreea; Florens, Jean-Pierre Identification and estimation in a third-price auction model. (English) Zbl 1440.62119 Econom. Theory 36, No. 3, 386-409 (2020). MSC: 62G07 62G08 62P20 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Enache} and \textit{J.-P. Florens}, Econom. Theory 36, No. 3, 386--409 (2020; Zbl 1440.62119) Full Text: DOI
Chernomaz, Kirill; Yoshimoto, Hisayuki How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? (English) Zbl 1440.62381 J. Econom. Methods 9, No. 1, Article ID 20170001, 19 p. (2020). MSC: 62P20 62G07 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{K. Chernomaz} and \textit{H. Yoshimoto}, J. Econom. Methods 9, No. 1, Article ID 20170001, 19 p. (2020; Zbl 1440.62381) Full Text: DOI
Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Baranov, Oleg Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1437.91213 Int. J. Game Theory 49, No. 1, 251-273 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91A27 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. M. Ausubel} and \textit{O. Baranov}, Int. J. Game Theory 49, No. 1, 251--273 (2020; Zbl 1437.91213) Full Text: DOI
Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John Dissolving a partnership securely. (English) Zbl 1437.91227 Econ. Theory 69, No. 2, 415-434 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B32 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Van Essen} and \textit{J. Wooders}, Econ. Theory 69, No. 2, 415--434 (2020; Zbl 1437.91227) Full Text: DOI
Holler, Manfred J.; Klose-Ullmann, Barbara Scissors and rock. Game theory for those who manage. (English) Zbl 07194769 Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-030-44822-6/pbk; 978-3-030-44823-3/ebook). xiv, 260 p. (2020). Reviewer: Krzysztof Leśniak (Torún) MSC: 91-02 91A05 91A06 91A10 91A14 91A18 91A20 91A30 91A43 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. J. Holler} and \textit{B. Klose-Ullmann}, Scissors and rock. Game theory for those who manage. Cham: Springer (2020; Zbl 07194769) Full Text: DOI
Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation. (English) Zbl 1437.91098 Games Econ. Behav. 121, 368-381 (2020). MSC: 91A28 91A90 91B44 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Cabrales} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 121, 368--381 (2020; Zbl 1437.91098) Full Text: DOI
Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim A speedy auction using approximated bidders’ preferences. (English) Zbl 1437.91219 Ann. Oper. Res. 288, No. 1, 65-93 (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Ingebretsen Carlson}, Ann. Oper. Res. 288, No. 1, 65--93 (2020; Zbl 1437.91219) Full Text: DOI
Kim, Jinwoo; Koh, Youngwoo Learning rivals’ information in interdependent value auctions. (English) Zbl 1437.91220 J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105029, 37 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Kim} and \textit{Y. Koh}, J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105029, 37 p. (2020; Zbl 1437.91220) Full Text: DOI
Gryc, William E. Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders. (English) Zbl 1436.91070 J. Econ. 129, No. 2, 103-142 (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{W. E. Gryc}, J. Econ. 129, No. 2, 103--142 (2020; Zbl 1436.91070) Full Text: DOI
Maschler, Michael; Solan, Eilon; Zamir, Shmuel Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns. 2nd edition. (English) Zbl 1440.91002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (ISBN 978-1-108-49345-1/hbk; 978-1-108-82514-6/pbk; 978-1-108-63604-9/ebook). xxvi, 1025 p. (2020). MSC: 91-01 00A08 91A10 91A12 91A18 91A20 91A30 91A46 91A60 91B26 91B68 91-03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Maschler} et al., Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020; Zbl 1440.91002) Full Text: DOI
Sanyal, Biswajit; Majumder, Subhashis; Hon, Wing-Kai; Gupta, Prosenjit Efficient meta-data structure in top-\(k\) queries of combinations and multi-item procurement auctions. (English) Zbl 1435.68073 Theor. Comput. Sci. 814, 210-222 (2020). MSC: 68P05 68P20 68R05 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Sanyal} et al., Theor. Comput. Sci. 814, 210--222 (2020; Zbl 1435.68073) Full Text: DOI
Pan, Lijun; Peng, Linyu; Zhou, Yu An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction. (English) Zbl 1431.91178 Econ. Lett. 188, Article ID 108905, 4 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Pan} et al., Econ. Lett. 188, Article ID 108905, 4 p. (2020; Zbl 1431.91178) Full Text: DOI
Deng, Sijing; Xu, Jiayan Ex ante and ex post subcontracting between two competing bidders. (English) Zbl 1433.91077 Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 37, No. 1, Article ID 1950035, 22 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Deng} and \textit{J. Xu}, Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 37, No. 1, Article ID 1950035, 22 p. (2020; Zbl 1433.91077) Full Text: DOI
Yokote, Koji The discrete separation theorem and price adjustment directions in markets with heterogeneous commodities. (English) Zbl 1443.91172 Discrete Appl. Math. 275, 134-143 (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{K. Yokote}, Discrete Appl. Math. 275, 134--143 (2020; Zbl 1443.91172) Full Text: DOI
Qian, Cheng; Anderson, Edward Buyer’s optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions. (English) Zbl 1441.91031 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 283, No. 3, 1011-1025 (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Qian} and \textit{E. Anderson}, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 283, No. 3, 1011--1025 (2020; Zbl 1441.91031) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Bo; Ma, Lijun; Zhu, Zhaobo; Zhou, Yu Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry. (English) Zbl 1429.91171 Econ. Lett. 186, Article ID 108805, 5 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Chen} et al., Econ. Lett. 186, Article ID 108805, 5 p. (2020; Zbl 1429.91171) Full Text: DOI
Noussair, Charles N.; Seres, Gyula The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions. (English) Zbl 1431.91177 Games Econ. Behav. 119, 267-287 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91-05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. N. Noussair} and \textit{G. Seres}, Games Econ. Behav. 119, 267--287 (2020; Zbl 1431.91177) Full Text: DOI
Lorentziadis, Panos L. Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement. (English) Zbl 1431.91172 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 282, No. 1, 211-220 (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. L. Lorentziadis}, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 282, No. 1, 211--220 (2020; Zbl 1431.91172) Full Text: DOI
Segev, Ella Crowdsourcing contests. (English) Zbl 1431.91180 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 281, No. 2, 241-255 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Segev}, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 281, No. 2, 241--255 (2020; Zbl 1431.91180) Full Text: DOI
Walsh, Joseph D.; Dieci, Luca A real-valued auction algorithm for optimal transport. (English) Zbl 07260657 Stat. Anal. Data Min. 12, No. 6, 514-533 (2019). MSC: 62 68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. D. Walsh} and \textit{L. Dieci}, Stat. Anal. Data Min. 12, No. 6, 514--533 (2019; Zbl 07260657) Full Text: DOI
Hammond, Robert G.; Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng; Riyanto, Yohanes E. Enhancing effort supply with prize-augmenting entry fees: theory and experiments. (English) Zbl 1444.91103 Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 3, 1063-1096 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. G. Hammond} et al., Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 3, 1063--1096 (2019; Zbl 1444.91103) Full Text: DOI Link
Jin, Yaonan; Li, Weian; Qi, Qi On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions. (English) Zbl 1435.91097 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 228-240 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 228--240 (2019; Zbl 1435.91097) Full Text: DOI
Wang, Zhen; Zhu, Jinghua; Li, Doudou Prediction based reverse auction incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing system. (English) Zbl 1435.68055 Li, Yingshu (ed.) et al., Combinatorial optimization and applications. 13th international conference, COCOA 2019, Xiamen, China, December 13–15, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11949, 541-552 (2019). MSC: 68M18 90B80 90C27 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Wang} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11949, 541--552 (2019; Zbl 1435.68055) Full Text: DOI
Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Kempe, David; Tardos, Eva Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals. (English) Zbl 1437.91226 Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 4, 1450-1476 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Syrgkanis} et al., Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 4, 1450--1476 (2019; Zbl 1437.91226) Full Text: DOI
Tran, Ngoc Mai; Yu, Josephine Product-mix auctions and tropical geometry. (English) Zbl 1434.91033 Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 4, 1396-1411 (2019). MSC: 91B26 90C24 14T90 90C10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. M. Tran} and \textit{J. Yu}, Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 4, 1396--1411 (2019; Zbl 1434.91033) Full Text: DOI
DĂĽtting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C. Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions. (English) Zbl 1443.91165 Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 1, 196-211 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. DĂĽtting} et al., Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 1, 196--211 (2019; Zbl 1443.91165) Full Text: DOI
Ye, Deshi; Xie, Feng; Zhang, Guochuan Truthful mechanism design of reversed auction on cloud computing. (English) Zbl 07172875 Du, Ding-Zhu (ed.) et al., Computing and combinatorics. 25th international conference, COCOON 2019, Xi’an, China, July 29–31, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-030-26175-7/pbk; 978-3-030-26176-4/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11653, 627-638 (2019). MSC: 68Rxx PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Ye} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11653, 627--638 (2019; Zbl 07172875) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yaonan; Lu, Pinyan; Qi, Qi; Tang, Zhihao Gavin; Xiao, Tao Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing. (English) Zbl 1433.91078 Charikar, Moses (ed.) et al., Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23–26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 674-685 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., in: Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC '19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23--26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 674--685 (2019; Zbl 1433.91078) Full Text: DOI
Lan, Zhuorui; Xia, Weiwei; Wu, Siyun; Yan, Feng; Shen, Lianfeng Joint wireless and cloud resource allocation based on parallel auction for mobile edge computing. (English) Zbl 1449.91054 J. Southeast Univ., Engl. Ed. 35, No. 2, 153-159 (2019). MSC: 91B32 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Lan} et al., J. Southeast Univ., Engl. Ed. 35, No. 2, 153--159 (2019; Zbl 1449.91054) Full Text: DOI
Zheng, Charles Z. Bidding collusion without passive updating. (English) Zbl 1430.91048 J. Math. Econ. 85, 70-77 (2019). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Z. Zheng}, J. Math. Econ. 85, 70--77 (2019; Zbl 1430.91048) Full Text: DOI
Festa, P.; Guerriero, F.; Napoletano, A. An auction-based approach for the re-optimization shortest path tree problem. (English) Zbl 1435.90137 Comput. Optim. Appl. 74, No. 3, 851-893 (2019). MSC: 90C35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Festa} et al., Comput. Optim. Appl. 74, No. 3, 851--893 (2019; Zbl 1435.90137) Full Text: DOI
Kirchkamp, Oliver; ReiĂź, J. Philipp Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment. (English) Zbl 1429.91176 Int. J. Game Theory 48, No. 4, 1001-1031 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Kirchkamp} and \textit{J. P. ReiĂź}, Int. J. Game Theory 48, No. 4, 1001--1031 (2019; Zbl 1429.91176) Full Text: DOI
Alaei, Saeed; Hartline, Jason; Niazadeh, Rad; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yuan, Yang Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing. (English) Zbl 1429.91167 Games Econ. Behav. 118, 494-510 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Alaei} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 118, 494--510 (2019; Zbl 1429.91167) Full Text: DOI
Barbieri, Stefano; Kovenock, Dan; Malueg, David A.; Topolyan, Iryna Group contests with private information and the “weakest link”. (English) Zbl 1429.91170 Games Econ. Behav. 118, 382-411 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A28 91A27 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Barbieri} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 118, 382--411 (2019; Zbl 1429.91170) Full Text: DOI
Xue, Man-Mang; Zhang, Jian-Zhong; Xie, Shu-Cui An efficient quantum sealed bidding auction scheme based on the correlation of genuine five-qubit entangled state. (English) Zbl 1428.81050 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58, No. 11, 3863-3870 (2019). MSC: 81P45 81P40 91B26 81P15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M.-M. Xue} et al., Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58, No. 11, 3863--3870 (2019; Zbl 1428.81050) Full Text: DOI
Heumann, Tibor An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals. (English) Zbl 1426.91135 J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104938, 23 p. (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Heumann}, J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104938, 23 p. (2019; Zbl 1426.91135) Full Text: DOI
Prokopovych, Pavlo; Yannelis, Nicholas C. On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information. (English) Zbl 1426.91139 J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104925, 29 p. (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Prokopovych} and \textit{N. C. Yannelis}, J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104925, 29 p. (2019; Zbl 1426.91139) Full Text: DOI
Avni, Guy; Henzinger, Thomas A.; Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus; NovotnĂ˝, Petr Bidding games on Markov decision processes. (English) Zbl 07121132 Filiot, Emmanuel (ed.) et al., Reachability problems. 13th international conference, RP 2019, Brussels, Belgium, September 11–13, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-030-30805-6/pbk; 978-3-030-30806-3/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11674, 1-12 (2019). MSC: 91A43 91A05 91A60 90C40 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Avni} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11674, 1--12 (2019; Zbl 07121132) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yaonan; Lu, Pinyan; Tang, Zhihao Gavin; Xiao, Tao Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1435.91062 Chan, Timothy M. (ed.), Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6–9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 209-228 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B26 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., in: Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6--9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 209--228 (2019; Zbl 1435.91062) Full Text: DOI
Bei, Xiaohui; Gravin, Nick; Lu, Pinyan; Tang, Zhihao Gavin Correlation-robust analysis of single item auction. (English) Zbl 1435.91094 Chan, Timothy M. (ed.), Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6–9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 193-208 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{X. Bei} et al., in: Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6--9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 193--208 (2019; Zbl 1435.91094) Full Text: DOI
Hu, Dongbin; Hu, Zijuan; Chen, Xiaohong Influence of agent-based bidding learning on carbon emission rights auction. (Chinese. English summary) Zbl 1438.91066 J. Syst. Eng. 34, No. 2, 170-185 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B76 90C59 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Hu} et al., J. Syst. Eng. 34, No. 2, 170--185 (2019; Zbl 1438.91066) Full Text: DOI
Zeng, Chengkuan; Liu, Shixin Auction-based cooperation mechanism for cell part scheduling with transportation capacity constraint. (Chinese. English summary) Zbl 1438.90125 Control Decis. 34, No. 4, 689-698 (2019). MSC: 90B35 90C10 90C30 90B06 91B26 90C35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Zeng} and \textit{S. Liu}, Control Decis. 34, No. 4, 689--698 (2019; Zbl 1438.90125) Full Text: DOI
Zhou, Zhenglong; Ma, Benjiang; Hu, Fengying Bilateral auction mechanism design in online peer-to-peer lending market. (Chinese. English summary) Zbl 1438.91067 Control Decis. 34, No. 3, 628-636 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 91G99 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Zhou} et al., Control Decis. 34, No. 3, 628--636 (2019; Zbl 1438.91067) Full Text: DOI
Ă–zer, Ali Haydar A double auction based mathematical market model and heuristics for Internet-based secondhand durable good markets. (English) Zbl 07109943 Comput. Oper. Res. 111, 116-129 (2019). MSC: 90B PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. H. Ă–zer}, Comput. Oper. Res. 111, 116--129 (2019; Zbl 07109943) Full Text: DOI
Choi, Syngjoo; Guerra, José-Alberto; Kim, Jinwoo Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment. (English) Zbl 1425.91185 Games Econ. Behav. 117, 218-237 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Choi} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 117, 218--237 (2019; Zbl 1425.91185) Full Text: DOI
Lee, Joosung; Li, Daniel Z. Participation and welfare in auctions with default. (English) Zbl 1420.91118 Econ. Lett. 183, Article ID 108620, 4 p. (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Lee} and \textit{D. Z. Li}, Econ. Lett. 183, Article ID 108620, 4 p. (2019; Zbl 1420.91118) Full Text: DOI
Hattori, Takahiro Do liquidity enhancement auctions improve the market liquidity in the JGB market? (English) Zbl 1420.91114 Econ. Lett. 183, Article ID 108516, 4 p. (2019). MSC: 91B26 91G20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Hattori}, Econ. Lett. 183, Article ID 108516, 4 p. (2019; Zbl 1420.91114) Full Text: DOI
Birmpas, Georgios; Markakis, Evangelos; Telelis, Orestis; Tsikiridis, Artem Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction. (English) Zbl 1422.91294 Theory Comput. Syst. 63, No. 7, 1451-1469 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Birmpas} et al., Theory Comput. Syst. 63, No. 7, 1451--1469 (2019; Zbl 1422.91294) Full Text: DOI
Wang, Qing; Shi, Run-hua; Chen, Zhang-kai; Wang, Sheng-lan A quantum sealed auction protocol based on secret sharing. (English) Zbl 1422.81094 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58, No. 4, 1128-1137 (2019). MSC: 81P94 94A60 81V80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Q. Wang} et al., Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58, No. 4, 1128--1137 (2019; Zbl 1422.81094) Full Text: DOI
Alvarez, Francisco; Mazón, Cristina; André, Francisco Javier Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient? (English) Zbl 1422.91286 Econ. Theory 67, No. 1, 211-248 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B76 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Alvarez} et al., Econ. Theory 67, No. 1, 211--248 (2019; Zbl 1422.91286) Full Text: DOI
Métivier, Ludovic; Brossier, R.; Mérigot, Q.; Oudet, E. A graph space optimal transport distance as a generalization of \(L^p\) distances: application to a seismic imaging inverse problem. (English) Zbl 1423.90145 Inverse Probl. 35, No. 8, Article ID 085001, 49 p. (2019). MSC: 90C08 90B80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Métivier} et al., Inverse Probl. 35, No. 8, Article ID 085001, 49 p. (2019; Zbl 1423.90145) Full Text: DOI
Liu, Enmeng; Liu, Jiapeng; Qiu, Hong; Wang, Jia Treasury bill auctions: do bidders’ cost of funds and winning probability matter? (English) Zbl 1418.91223 Econ. Lett. 182, 101-104 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Liu} et al., Econ. Lett. 182, 101--104 (2019; Zbl 1418.91223) Full Text: DOI
Huang, Yangguang; Wen, Quan Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis. (English) Zbl 1422.91308 Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 1, 355-385 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Huang} and \textit{Q. Wen}, Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 1, 355--385 (2019; Zbl 1422.91308) Full Text: DOI
Baldwin, Elizabeth; Klemperer, Paul Understanding preferences: “demand types”, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities. (English) Zbl 1422.91212 Econometrica 87, No. 3, 867-932 (2019). MSC: 91B08 91B26 91B42 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Baldwin} and \textit{P. Klemperer}, Econometrica 87, No. 3, 867--932 (2019; Zbl 1422.91212) Full Text: DOI
Chouayakh, Ayman; Bechler, AurĂ©lien; Amigo, Isabel; Nuaymi, Loutfi; MaillĂ©, Patrick A truthful auction mechanism for dynamic allocation of LSA spectrum blocks for 5G. (English) Zbl 1417.91231 Walrand, Jean (ed.) et al., Network games, control, and optimization. Proceedings of NETGCOOP 2018, New York, NY, USA, November 14–16, 2018. Cham: Birkhäuser. Static Dyn. Game Theory: Found. Appl., 219-232 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B32 90B18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Chouayakh} et al., in: Network games, control, and optimization. Proceedings of NETGCOOP 2018, New York, NY, USA, November 14--16, 2018. Cham: Birkhäuser. 219--232 (2019; Zbl 1417.91231) Full Text: DOI
Kolar Purushothama, Naveen Coexistence of LTE-unlicensed and WiFi with optimal channel aggregation. (English) Zbl 1417.91241 Walrand, Jean (ed.) et al., Network games, control, and optimization. Proceedings of NETGCOOP 2018, New York, NY, USA, November 14–16, 2018. Cham: Birkhäuser. Static Dyn. Game Theory: Found. Appl., 37-54 (2019). MSC: 91B26 90B18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Kolar Purushothama}, in: Network games, control, and optimization. Proceedings of NETGCOOP 2018, New York, NY, USA, November 14--16, 2018. Cham: Birkhäuser. 37--54 (2019; Zbl 1417.91241) Full Text: DOI
Umbhauer, Gisèle Second-price all-pay auctions and best-reply matching equilibria. (English) Zbl 1417.91259 Int. Game Theory Rev. 21, No. 2, Article ID 1940009, 40 p. (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B68 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Umbhauer}, Int. Game Theory Rev. 21, No. 2, Article ID 1940009, 40 p. (2019; Zbl 1417.91259) Full Text: DOI
Elskamp, Rebecca; Kirkegaard, René Scale effects in multi-unit auctions. (English) Zbl 1417.91236 Games Econ. Behav. 116, 116-121 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Elskamp} and \textit{R. Kirkegaard}, Games Econ. Behav. 116, 116--121 (2019; Zbl 1417.91236) Full Text: DOI
Tajika, Tomoya; Kazumura, Tomoya Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects. (English) Zbl 1417.91255 Int. J. Game Theory 48, No. 2, 543-569 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Tajika} and \textit{T. Kazumura}, Int. J. Game Theory 48, No. 2, 543--569 (2019; Zbl 1417.91255) Full Text: DOI
Xiang, Jie; Zhang, Juliang; Cheng, T. C. E.; Sallan, Jose Maria; Hua, Guowei Efficient multi-attribute auctions considering supply disruption. (English) Zbl 1418.90026 Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 36, No. 3, Article ID 1950013, 28 p. (2019). MSC: 90B05 90B50 90B25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Xiang} et al., Asia-Pac. J. Oper. Res. 36, No. 3, Article ID 1950013, 28 p. (2019; Zbl 1418.90026) Full Text: DOI
Grundl, Serafin; Zhu, Yu Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity. (English) Zbl 1452.91162 J. Econom. 210, No. 2, 363-378 (2019). MSC: 91B26 62P20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Grundl} and \textit{Y. Zhu}, J. Econom. 210, No. 2, 363--378 (2019; Zbl 1452.91162) Full Text: DOI
Baisa, Brian; Burkett, Justin Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences. (English) Zbl 1417.91225 J. Math. Econ. 82, 227-246 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B08 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Baisa} and \textit{J. Burkett}, J. Math. Econ. 82, 227--246 (2019; Zbl 1417.91225) Full Text: DOI
Bubeck, Sébastien; Devanur, Nikhil R.; Huang, Zhiyi; Niazadeh, Rad Multi-scale online learning: theory and applications to online auctions and pricing. (English) Zbl 07064042 J. Mach. Learn. Res. 20, Paper No. 62, 37 p. (2019). MSC: 68T05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bubeck} et al., J. Mach. Learn. Res. 20, Paper No. 62, 37 p. (2019; Zbl 07064042) Full Text: Link
Hefti, Andreas; Shen, Peiyao Supply function competition with asymmetric costs: theory and experiment. (English) Zbl 1411.91255 Econ. Lett. 178, 24-27 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Hefti} and \textit{P. Shen}, Econ. Lett. 178, 24--27 (2019; Zbl 1411.91255) Full Text: DOI
Liu, Lu; Wang, Chun; Wang, Jianjun A combinatorial auction mechanism for surgical scheduling considering surgeon’s private availability information. (English) Zbl 1421.90127 J. Comb. Optim. 37, No. 1, 405-417 (2019). MSC: 90C27 90B35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Liu} et al., J. Comb. Optim. 37, No. 1, 405--417 (2019; Zbl 1421.90127) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Bo On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions. (English) Zbl 1411.91252 Econ. Lett. 177, 60-65 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Chen}, Econ. Lett. 177, 60--65 (2019; Zbl 1411.91252) Full Text: DOI
Chakraborty, Indranil Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders. (English) Zbl 1419.91316 Games Econ. Behav. 113, 209-222 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Chakraborty}, Games Econ. Behav. 113, 209--222 (2019; Zbl 1419.91316) Full Text: DOI
Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S. Matthew Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1419.91332 Games Econ. Behav. 113, 97-115 (2019). MSC: 91B26 93E20 05B35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Kleinberg} and \textit{S. M. Weinberg}, Games Econ. Behav. 113, 97--115 (2019; Zbl 1419.91332) Full Text: DOI
Chawla, Shuchi; Hartline, Jason D.; Sivan, Balasubramanian Optimal crowdsourcing contests. (English) Zbl 1419.91318 Games Econ. Behav. 113, 80-96 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Chawla} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 113, 80--96 (2019; Zbl 1419.91318) Full Text: DOI
Zheng, Charles Z. Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security. (English) Zbl 1419.91344 J. Econ. Theory 180, 135-166 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A05 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Z. Zheng}, J. Econ. Theory 180, 135--166 (2019; Zbl 1419.91344) Full Text: DOI
Fanzeres, Bruno; Ahmed, Shabbir; Street, Alexandre Robust strategic bidding in auction-based markets. (English) Zbl 1403.91170 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 272, No. 3, 1158-1172 (2019). MSC: 91B26 90C33 90C31 90C90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Fanzeres} et al., Eur. J. Oper. Res. 272, No. 3, 1158--1172 (2019; Zbl 1403.91170) Full Text: DOI
Khoroshilov, Yuri Partnership dissolution: information and efficiency. (English) Zbl 07244484 Decis. Anal. 15, No. 3, 133-138 (2018). MSC: 91 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Khoroshilov}, Decis. Anal. 15, No. 3, 133--138 (2018; Zbl 07244484) Full Text: DOI
Kvam, Paul H. A probability model for strategic bidding on “The price is right”. (English) Zbl 07244478 Decis. Anal. 15, No. 4, 195-207 (2018). MSC: 91 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. H. Kvam}, Decis. Anal. 15, No. 4, 195--207 (2018; Zbl 07244478) Full Text: DOI
Hounwanou, Didier Dègnidé Participation costs and inefficiency in takeover contests. (English) Zbl 07244465 Decis. Anal. 15, No. 1, 1-10 (2018). MSC: 91 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. D. Hounwanou}, Decis. Anal. 15, No. 1, 1--10 (2018; Zbl 07244465) Full Text: DOI
Deng, Xiaotie; Zhu, Keyu On Bayesian epistemology of Myerson auction. (English) Zbl 1446.68137 Chen, Jianer (ed.) et al., Frontiers in algorithmics. 12th international workshop, FAW 2018, Guangzhou, China, May 8–10, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 10823, 183-196 (2018). MSC: 68T05 68T37 91A10 91A80 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{X. Deng} and \textit{K. Zhu}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 10823, 183--196 (2018; Zbl 1446.68137) Full Text: DOI
Nikolova, Evdokia; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yang, Ger Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents. (English) Zbl 1443.91096 Christodoulou, George (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 14th international conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15–17, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 375-392 (2018). MSC: 91B03 91B26 91B16 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Nikolova} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 375--392 (2018; Zbl 1443.91096) Full Text: DOI
Giannakopoulos, Yiannis; Zhu, Keyu Optimal pricing for MHR distributions. (English) Zbl 1443.91167 Christodoulou, George (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 14th international conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15–17, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 154-167 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Giannakopoulos} and \textit{K. Zhu}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 154--167 (2018; Zbl 1443.91167) Full Text: DOI