×

Exchange models with indivisible commodities, and implementation of competitive equilibria in games of auction type. (English. Russian original) Zbl 0832.90024

Russ. Acad. Sci., Dokl., Math. 49, No. 1, 15-19 (1994); translation from Dokl. Akad. Nauk, Ross. Akad. Nauk 334, No. 1, 16-19 (1994).
Summary: Exchange models with indivisible commodities have been studied in mathematical economics from the beginning of the 1970’s. Competitive equilibria occupy an important place in these investigations. It is usually assumed that each participant of an exchange can own at most one indivisible commodity, along with an amount of money (exchange of homes). Exchange models without money were also studied.
We consider models of both types in the absence of constraints on the number of commodities that can be owned and exchanged by participants. We shall be interested in what can be called a realization (or implementation) of specified allocations of commodities by means of Nash equilibria in a certain game of auction type. This is connected with the study of equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium properties of realizable allocations.

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A12 Cooperative games
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
91B52 Special types of economic equilibria
91B54 Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
PDFBibTeX XMLCite