Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments. (English) Zbl 1417.91243 J. Math. Econ. 82, 214-226 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. M. Manelli} and \textit{D. R. Vincent}, J. Math. Econ. 82, 214--226 (2019; Zbl 1417.91243) Full Text: DOI
Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model. (English) Zbl 1204.91057 Econometrica 78, No. 6, 1905-1938 (2010). MSC: 91B26 62C10 91B69 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. M. Manelli} and \textit{D. R. Vincent}, Econometrica 78, No. 6, 1905--1938 (2010; Zbl 1204.91057) Full Text: DOI
Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. (English) Zbl 1132.91435 J. Econ. Theory 137, No. 1, 153-185 (2007); corrigendum ibid. 147, No. 6, 2492-2493 (2012). MSC: 91B24 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. M. Manelli} and \textit{D. R. Vincent}, J. Econ. Theory 137, No. 1, 153--185 (2007; Zbl 1132.91435) Full Text: DOI Link
Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist. (English) Zbl 1122.91032 J. Econ. Theory 127, No. 1, 1-35 (2006). MSC: 91B26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. M. Manelli} and \textit{D. R. Vincent}, J. Econ. Theory 127, No. 1, 1--35 (2006; Zbl 1122.91032) Full Text: DOI
Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. Optimal procurement mechanisms. (English) Zbl 0837.90033 Econometrica 63, No. 3, 591-620 (1995). MSC: 91B26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. M. Manelli} and \textit{D. R. Vincent}, Econometrica 63, No. 3, 591--620 (1995; Zbl 0837.90033) Full Text: DOI Link