McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems. (English) Zbl 1393.91091 Games Econ. Behav. 101, 34-48 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91B32 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. P. McLean} and \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Games Econ. Behav. 101, 34--48 (2017; Zbl 1393.91091) Full Text: DOI
Mclean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew Implementation with interdependent valuations. (English) Zbl 1395.91233 Theor. Econ. 10, No. 3, 923-952 (2015). MSC: 91B26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. P. Mclean} and \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Theor. Econ. 10, No. 3, 923--952 (2015; Zbl 1395.91233) Full Text: DOI
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1124.91350 Games Econ. Behav. 45, No. 1, 222-241 (2003). MSC: 91B44 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. P. McLean} and \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Games Econ. Behav. 45, No. 1, 222--241 (2003; Zbl 1124.91350) Full Text: DOI
Gul, Faruk; Postlewaite, Andrew Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information. (English) Zbl 0785.90027 Econometrica 60, No. 6, 1273-1292 (1992). Reviewer: S.Turnbull (Columbus / Ohio) MSC: 91B50 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{F. Gul} and \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Econometrica 60, No. 6, 1273--1292 (1992; Zbl 0785.90027) Full Text: DOI