Andersson, Tommy; Kratz, Jörgen Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier. (English) Zbl 1460.91167 Rev. Econ. Stud. 87, No. 3, 1091-1133 (2020). MSC: 91B68 92C50 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Andersson} and \textit{J. Kratz}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 87, No. 3, 1091--1133 (2020; Zbl 1460.91167) Full Text: DOI
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto Level-\(k\) mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1479.91068 Rev. Econ. Stud. 86, No. 3, 1207-1227 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B14 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{G. de Clippel} et al., Rev. Econ. Stud. 86, No. 3, 1207--1227 (2019; Zbl 1479.91068) Full Text: DOI
di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias The design of ambiguous mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1471.91084 Rev. Econ. Stud. 84, No. 1, 237-276 (2017). MSC: 91B03 91B06 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. di Tillio} et al., Rev. Econ. Stud. 84, No. 1, 237--276 (2017; Zbl 1471.91084) Full Text: DOI Link
Miller, David A. Robust collusion with private information. (English) Zbl 1405.91030 Rev. Econ. Stud. 79, No. 2, 778-811 (2012). MSC: 91A20 91B24 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. A. Miller}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 79, No. 2, 778--811 (2012; Zbl 1405.91030) Full Text: DOI
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen Robust implementation in direct mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1187.91057 Rev. Econ. Stud. 76, No. 4, 1175-1204 (2009). MSC: 91B14 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. Bergemann} and \textit{S. Morris}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 76, No. 4, 1175--1204 (2009; Zbl 1187.91057) Full Text: DOI
Brainard, S. Lael; Martimort, David Strategic trade policy design with asymmetric information and public contracts. (English) Zbl 0841.90031 Rev. Econ. Stud. 63, No. 1, 81-105 (1996). MSC: 91B60 93C95 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{S. L. Brainard} and \textit{D. Martimort}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 63, No. 1, 81--105 (1996; Zbl 0841.90031) Full Text: DOI
Rochet, Jean-Charles; Vila, Jean-Luc Insider trading without normality. (English) Zbl 0796.90004 Rev. Econ. Stud. 61, No. 1, 131-152 (1994). MSC: 91B50 91B44 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J.-C. Rochet} and \textit{J.-L. Vila}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 61, No. 1, 131--152 (1994; Zbl 0796.90004) Full Text: DOI
Moore, John Contracting between two parties with private information. (English) Zbl 0634.90007 Rev. Econ. Stud. 55, No. 1, 49-69 (1988). MSC: 91B24 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Moore}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 55, No. 1, 49--69 (1988; Zbl 0634.90007) Full Text: DOI
Hammond, Peter J. Markets as constraints: Multilateral incentive compatibility in continuum economies. (English) Zbl 0635.90005 Rev. Econ. Stud. 54, 399-412 (1987). MSC: 91B14 91B50 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. J. Hammond}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 54, 399--412 (1987; Zbl 0635.90005) Full Text: DOI
Campbell, Donald E. Algorithms for social choice functions. (English) Zbl 0437.90014 Rev. Econ. Stud. 47, 617-627 (1980). MSC: 91B14 65K05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. E. Campbell}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 47, 617--627 (1980; Zbl 0437.90014) Full Text: DOI
Roberts, John Incentives in planning procedures for the provision of public goods. (English) Zbl 0422.90020 Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 283-292 (1979). MSC: 91B62 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Roberts}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 283--292 (1979; Zbl 0422.90020) Full Text: DOI Link
Green, Jerry; Laffont, Jean-Jacques On coalition incentive compatibility. (English) Zbl 0419.90012 Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 243-254 (1979). MSC: 91B14 91B10 91A10 91A12 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Green} and \textit{J.-J. Laffont}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 243--254 (1979; Zbl 0419.90012) Full Text: DOI Link
Dasgupta, Partha; Hammond, Peter; Maskin, Eric The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility. (English) Zbl 0413.90007 Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 185-216 (1979). MSC: 91B14 90-02 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. Dasgupta} et al., Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 185--216 (1979; Zbl 0413.90007) Full Text: DOI
Hammond, Peter J. Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies. (English) Zbl 0409.90019 Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 263-282 (1979). MSC: 91B60 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. J. Hammond}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 263--282 (1979; Zbl 0409.90019) Full Text: DOI