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Two definitions of correlated equilibrium. (English) Zbl 1448.91055

The authors prove that the original and the canonical version of correlated equilibrium, although equivalent from an ex-ante perspective, are actually distinct – both doxastically as well as behaviourally – from an interim perspective: while Aumann’s correlated equilibrium can be epistemically characterized by common belief in rationality and a common prior, canonical correlated equilibrium additionally requires the condition of one-theory-per-choice.

MSC:

91A26 Rationality and learning in game theory
91A11 Equilibrium refinements
91A05 2-person games
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References:

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