Kultti, Klaus; Salonen, Hannu Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property. (English) Zbl 1058.91504 Int. J. Game Theory 27, No. 2, 305-309 (1998). Summary: We show that in quasisupermodular games that satisfy strict single crossing property the least and greatest undominated Nash-equilibrium can be reached by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies. In the first round all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. In the successive rounds all strictly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated. Cited in 1 Document MSC: 91A06 \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\) Keywords:Strategic complements; iterated dominance PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Kultti} and \textit{H. Salonen}, Int. J. Game Theory 27, No. 2, 305--309 (1998; Zbl 1058.91504) Full Text: DOI