Duffy, John; Matros, Alexander Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: some new results. (English) Zbl 1364.91025 Econ. Lett. 134, 4-8 (2015). Summary: We develop some new theoretical results for stochastic asymmetric Blotto games. Cited in 1 ReviewCited in 9 Documents MSC: 91A15 Stochastic games, stochastic differential games 91A05 2-person games 91B32 Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) Keywords:Colonel Blotto game; contests; resource allocation; lotteries PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Duffy} and \textit{A. Matros}, Econ. Lett. 134, 4--8 (2015; Zbl 1364.91025) Full Text: DOI Link References: [1] Banzhaf, J., Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Rev., 19, 317-343 (1965) [2] Borel, E., La théorie du jeu et les équations intégrales à noyan symétrique, C. R. Acad. Sci., 173, 1304-1308 (1921), English translation by L. Savage, “The theory of play and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels”. Econometrica 21, (1953), 97-100 · JFM 48.0599.03 [3] Friedman, L., Game-theory models in the allocation of advertising expenditures, Oper. Res., 6, 5, 699-709 (1958) · Zbl 1414.90184 [4] Kovenock, D.; Roberson, B., Conflicts with multiple battlefields, (Garfinkel, M. R.; Skaperdas, S., Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (2012), Oxford University Press: Oxford University Press Oxford), 503-530 [5] Lake, M., A new campaign resource allocation model, (Brams, S. J.; Schotter, A.; Schwodiauer, G., Applied Game Theory (1979), Physica-Verlag: Physica-Verlag Wurzburg, West Germany), 118-132 · Zbl 0421.90099 [6] Osorio, A., The lottery Blotto game, Econom. Lett., 120, 164-166 (2013) · Zbl 1284.91287 This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.