Andersson, Tommy; Kratz, Jörgen Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier. (English) Zbl 07328328 Rev. Econ. Stud. 87, No. 3, 1091-1133 (2020). MSC: 91B68 92C50 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Andersson} and \textit{J. Kratz}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 87, No. 3, 1091--1133 (2020; Zbl 07328328) Full Text: DOI
Kaleta, Mariusz Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters. (English) Zbl 07311714 CEJOR, Cent. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 28, No. 4, 1291-1314 (2020). MSC: 90B PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Kaleta}, CEJOR, Cent. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 28, No. 4, 1291--1314 (2020; Zbl 07311714) Full Text: DOI
Kojima, Fuhito; Shi, Fanqi; Vohra, Akhil Market design. (English) Zbl 1455.91165 Sotomayor, Marilda (ed.) et al., Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. Encycl. Complex. Syst. Sci. Ser., 401-419 (2020). MSC: 91B68 91B32 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Kojima} et al., in: Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. 401--419 (2020; Zbl 1455.91165) Full Text: DOI
Lavi, Ron Mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1454.91055 Sotomayor, Marilda (ed.) et al., Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. Encycl. Complex. Syst. Sci. Ser., 317-333 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Lavi}, in: Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. 317--333 (2020; Zbl 1454.91055) Full Text: DOI
Yanikara, F. Selin; Andrianesis, Panagiotis; Caramanis, Michael Power markets with information-aware self-scheduling electric vehicles. (English) Zbl 07301387 Dyn. Games Appl. 10, No. 4, 930-967 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91A25 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. S. Yanikara} et al., Dyn. Games Appl. 10, No. 4, 930--967 (2020; Zbl 07301387) Full Text: DOI
Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design. (English) Zbl 07300997 J. Econ. Theory 190, Article ID 105120, 65 p. (2020). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Ashlagi} and \textit{A. Nikzad}, J. Econ. Theory 190, Article ID 105120, 65 p. (2020; Zbl 07300997) Full Text: DOI
Nakamura, Yuta The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness. (English) Zbl 1455.91068 Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 3-4, 171-186 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Nakamura}, Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 3--4, 171--186 (2020; Zbl 1455.91068) Full Text: DOI
Sundararajan, Mukund; Yan, Qiqi Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. (English) Zbl 1452.91168 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 644-658 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Sundararajan} and \textit{Q. Yan}, Games Econ. Behav. 124, 644--658 (2020; Zbl 1452.91168) Full Text: DOI
Abraham, Ittai; Athey, Susan; Babaioff, Moshe; Grubb, Michael D. Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information. (English) Zbl 1452.91156 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 454-477 (2020). MSC: 91B26 90B60 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Abraham} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 124, 454--477 (2020; Zbl 1452.91156) Full Text: DOI
Shafer, Rachel C. Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets. (English) Zbl 1452.91167 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 281-287 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. C. Shafer}, Games Econ. Behav. 124, 281--287 (2020; Zbl 1452.91167) Full Text: DOI
Ashlagi, Itai; Saberi, Amin; Shameli, Ali Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints. (English) Zbl 1446.90103 Oper. Res. 68, No. 2, 467-479 (2020). MSC: 90B80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Ashlagi} et al., Oper. Res. 68, No. 2, 467--479 (2020; Zbl 1446.90103) Full Text: DOI
Goel, Gagan; Mirrokni, Vahab; Paes Leme, Renato Clinching auctions with online supply. (English) Zbl 1452.91161 Games Econ. Behav. 123, 342-358 (2020). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Goel} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 123, 342--358 (2020; Zbl 1452.91161) Full Text: DOI
Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nick; Lucier, Brendan Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. (English) Zbl 1448.91122 Games Econ. Behav. 123, 327-341 (2020). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 91A10 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Feldman} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 123, 327--341 (2020; Zbl 1448.91122) Full Text: DOI
Shrivats, Arvind; Jaimungal, Sebastian Optimal generation and trading in solar renewable energy certificate (SREC) markets. (English) Zbl 1451.91203 Appl. Math. Finance 27, No. 1-2, 99-131 (2020). Reviewer: Yuliya S. Mishura (Kyïv) MSC: 91G20 91G15 93E20 91B76 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Shrivats} and \textit{S. Jaimungal}, Appl. Math. Finance 27, No. 1--2, 99--131 (2020; Zbl 1451.91203) Full Text: DOI
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig Strictly strategy-proof auctions. (English) Zbl 1450.91014 Math. Soc. Sci. 107, 13-16 (2020). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Escudé} and \textit{L. Sinander}, Math. Soc. Sci. 107, 13--16 (2020; Zbl 1450.91014) Full Text: DOI
Terstiege, Stefan; Wasser, Cédric Buyer-optimal extensionproof information. (English) Zbl 1447.91077 J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105070, 43 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Terstiege} and \textit{C. Wasser}, J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105070, 43 p. (2020; Zbl 1447.91077) Full Text: DOI
Aygün, Orhan; Turhan, Bertan Dynamic reserves in matching markets. (English) Zbl 1447.91100 J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105069, 28 p. (2020). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Aygün} and \textit{B. Turhan}, J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105069, 28 p. (2020; Zbl 1447.91100) Full Text: DOI
Utgoff, Naomi Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1447.91103 J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105054, 22 p. (2020). MSC: 91B68 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Utgoff}, J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105054, 22 p. (2020; Zbl 1447.91103) Full Text: DOI
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. (English) Zbl 1447.91036 J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105036, 29 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B24 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Kazumura} et al., J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105036, 29 p. (2020; Zbl 1447.91036) Full Text: DOI
Baisa, Brian Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods. (English) Zbl 1444.91102 Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 361-413 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Baisa}, Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 361--413 (2020; Zbl 1444.91102) Full Text: DOI
Raghavan, Madhav Influence in private-goods allocation. (English) Zbl 1437.91238 J. Math. Econ. 89, 14-28 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Raghavan}, J. Math. Econ. 89, 14--28 (2020; Zbl 1437.91238) Full Text: DOI
Amini, Hamed; Filipović, Damir; Minca, Andreea Systemic risk in networks with a central node. (English) Zbl 1443.91315 SIAM J. Financ. Math. 11, No. 1, 60-98 (2020). MSC: 91G45 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Amini} et al., SIAM J. Financ. Math. 11, No. 1, 60--98 (2020; Zbl 1443.91315) Full Text: DOI
Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M. A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism. (English) Zbl 1437.91223 Games Econ. Behav. 120, 1-15 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Loertscher} and \textit{L. M. Marx}, Games Econ. Behav. 120, 1--15 (2020; Zbl 1437.91223) Full Text: DOI
Devanur, Nikhil R.; Haghpanah, Nima; Psomas, Alexandros Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands. (English) Zbl 1437.91127 Games Econ. Behav. 121, 482-505 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. R. Devanur} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 121, 482--505 (2020; Zbl 1437.91127) Full Text: DOI
Lv, Hongtao; Wu, Fan; Luo, Tie; Gao, Xiaofeng; Chen, Guihai Hardness of and approximate mechanism design for the bike rebalancing problem. (English) Zbl 1443.91095 Theor. Comput. Sci. 803, 105-115 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 68Q17 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Lv} et al., Theor. Comput. Sci. 803, 105--115 (2020; Zbl 1443.91095) Full Text: DOI
Antoniou, Josephina Game theory, the Internet of Things and 5G networks. Utilizing game theoretic models to characterize challenging scenarios. (English) Zbl 1435.91003 EAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-030-16843-8/hbk; 978-3-030-16846-9/pbk; 978-3-030-16844-5/ebook). vii, 110 p. (2020). Reviewer: Agnieszka Rusinowska (Paris) MSC: 91-02 91A12 91A20 91A27 91A80 91B16 91B26 90B18 68M10 68M11 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Antoniou}, Game theory, the Internet of Things and 5G networks. Utilizing game theoretic models to characterize challenging scenarios. Cham: Springer (2020; Zbl 1435.91003) Full Text: DOI
Ashlagi, Itai; Burq, Maximilien; Jaillet, Patrick; Manshadi, Vahideh On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets. (English) Zbl 1455.91162 Oper. Res. 67, No. 4, 927-949 (2019). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Ashlagi} et al., Oper. Res. 67, No. 4, 927--949 (2019; Zbl 1455.91162) Full Text: DOI
Balseiro, Santiago R.; Besbes, Omar; Weintraub, Gabriel Y. Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment. (English) Zbl 1455.91066 Oper. Res. 67, No. 3, 711-730 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. R. Balseiro} et al., Oper. Res. 67, No. 3, 711--730 (2019; Zbl 1455.91066) Full Text: DOI
Markakis, Evangelos; Tsikiridis, Artem On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions. (English) Zbl 1435.91098 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 271-285 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Markakis} and \textit{A. Tsikiridis}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 271--285 (2019; Zbl 1435.91098) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yaonan; Li, Weian; Qi, Qi On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions. (English) Zbl 1435.91097 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 228-240 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 228--240 (2019; Zbl 1435.91097) Full Text: DOI
Dutta, Bhaskar Recent results on implementation with complete information. (English) Zbl 1443.91092 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 249-260 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B26 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Dutta}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 249--260 (2019; Zbl 1443.91092) Full Text: DOI
Ledyard, John O. Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement. (English) Zbl 1443.91169 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 139-156 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. O. Ledyard}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 139--156 (2019; Zbl 1443.91169) Full Text: DOI
Wang, Zhen; Zhu, Jinghua; Li, Doudou Prediction based reverse auction incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing system. (English) Zbl 1435.68055 Li, Yingshu (ed.) et al., Combinatorial optimization and applications. 13th international conference, COCOA 2019, Xiamen, China, December 13–15, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11949, 541-552 (2019). MSC: 68M18 90B80 90C27 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Wang} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11949, 541--552 (2019; Zbl 1435.68055) Full Text: DOI
Cai, Desmond; Bose, Subhonmesh; Wierman, Adam On the role of a market maker in networked Cournot competition. (English) Zbl 1437.91042 Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 3, 1122-1144 (2019). MSC: 91A14 91B54 91A80 91B15 90B10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Cai} et al., Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 3, 1122--1144 (2019; Zbl 1437.91042) Full Text: DOI
Dütting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C. Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions. (English) Zbl 1443.91165 Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 1, 196-211 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Dütting} et al., Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 1, 196--211 (2019; Zbl 1443.91165) Full Text: DOI
Beyhaghi, Hedyeh; Weinberg, S. Matthew Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items. (English) Zbl 1437.91214 Charikar, Moses (ed.) et al., Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23–26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 686-696 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 91A68 60E15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Beyhaghi} and \textit{S. M. Weinberg}, in: Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC '19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23--26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 686--696 (2019; Zbl 1437.91214) Full Text: DOI Link
Jin, Yaonan; Lu, Pinyan; Qi, Qi; Tang, Zhihao Gavin; Xiao, Tao Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing. (English) Zbl 1433.91078 Charikar, Moses (ed.) et al., Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23–26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 674-685 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., in: Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC '19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23--26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 674--685 (2019; Zbl 1433.91078) Full Text: DOI
Guo, Chenghao; Huang, Zhiyi; Zhang, Xinzhi Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization. (English) Zbl 1433.91049 Charikar, Moses (ed.) et al., Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23–26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 662-673 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Guo} et al., in: Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC '19, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 23--26, 2019. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 662--673 (2019; Zbl 1433.91049) Full Text: DOI Link
Huang, Zhiyi; Kim, Anthony Welfare maximization with production costs: a primal dual approach. (English) Zbl 1429.91173 Games Econ. Behav. 118, 648-667 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 91B15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Huang} and \textit{A. Kim}, Games Econ. Behav. 118, 648--667 (2019; Zbl 1429.91173) Full Text: DOI
Azar, Pablo D.; Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S. Matthew Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information. (English) Zbl 1429.91169 Games Econ. Behav. 118, 511-532 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. D. Azar} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 118, 511--532 (2019; Zbl 1429.91169) Full Text: DOI
Alaei, Saeed; Hartline, Jason; Niazadeh, Rad; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yuan, Yang Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing. (English) Zbl 1429.91167 Games Econ. Behav. 118, 494-510 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Alaei} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 118, 494--510 (2019; Zbl 1429.91167) Full Text: DOI
Doğan, Battal; Yenmez, M. Bumin Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago. (English) Zbl 1429.91231 Games Econ. Behav. 118, 366-373 (2019). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Doğan} and \textit{M. B. Yenmez}, Games Econ. Behav. 118, 366--373 (2019; Zbl 1429.91231) Full Text: DOI
Kleinert, Thomas; Schmidt, Martin Global optimization of multilevel electricity market models including network design and graph partitioning. (English) Zbl 07138061 Discrete Optim. 33, 43-69 (2019). MSC: 90C11 90-08 90B10 90C35 90C90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Kleinert} and \textit{M. Schmidt}, Discrete Optim. 33, 43--69 (2019; Zbl 07138061) Full Text: DOI
Silva, Francisco Renegotiation-proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification. (English) Zbl 1427.91141 Theor. Econ. 14, No. 3, 971-1014 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Silva}, Theor. Econ. 14, No. 3, 971--1014 (2019; Zbl 1427.91141) Full Text: DOI Link
Hagen, Martin Collusion-proof and fair auctions. (English) Zbl 1425.91195 Econ. Lett. 185, Article ID 108682, 4 p. (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B14 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Hagen}, Econ. Lett. 185, Article ID 108682, 4 p. (2019; Zbl 1425.91195) Full Text: DOI
Ellman, Matthew; Hurkens, Sjaak Optimal crowdfunding design. (English) Zbl 1426.91295 J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104939, 36 p. (2019). MSC: 91G50 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Ellman} and \textit{S. Hurkens}, J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104939, 36 p. (2019; Zbl 1426.91295) Full Text: DOI
Reiffenhauser, Rebecca An optimal truthful mechanism for the online weighted bipartite matching problem. (English) Zbl 1432.68592 Chan, Timothy M. (ed.), Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6–9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 1982-1993 (2019). MSC: 68W27 05C70 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Reiffenhauser}, in: Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6--9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 1982--1993 (2019; Zbl 1432.68592) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yaonan; Lu, Pinyan; Tang, Zhihao Gavin; Xiao, Tao Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1435.91062 Chan, Timothy M. (ed.), Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6–9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 209-228 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B26 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., in: Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6--9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 209--228 (2019; Zbl 1435.91062) Full Text: DOI
Balseiro, Santiago R.; Mirrokni, Vahab; Paes Leme, Renato; Zuo, Song Dynamic double auctions: towards first best. (English) Zbl 1435.91093 Chan, Timothy M. (ed.), Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6–9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 157-172 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. R. Balseiro} et al., in: Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, January 6--9, 2019. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 157--172 (2019; Zbl 1435.91093) Full Text: DOI
Saygili, Kemal; Kucuksenel, Serkan Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies. (English) Zbl 1425.91256 J. Econ. 126, No. 3, 201-219 (2019). MSC: 91B40 91B08 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{K. Saygili} and \textit{S. Kucuksenel}, J. Econ. 126, No. 3, 201--219 (2019; Zbl 1425.91256) Full Text: DOI
Zhou, Zhenglong; Ma, Benjiang; Hu, Fengying Bilateral auction mechanism design in online peer-to-peer lending market. (Chinese. English summary) Zbl 1438.91067 Control Decis. 34, No. 3, 628-636 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 91G99 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Zhou} et al., Control Decis. 34, No. 3, 628--636 (2019; Zbl 1438.91067) Full Text: DOI
Özer, Ali Haydar A double auction based mathematical market model and heuristics for Internet-based secondhand durable good markets. (English) Zbl 07109943 Comput. Oper. Res. 111, 116-129 (2019). MSC: 90B PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. H. Özer}, Comput. Oper. Res. 111, 116--129 (2019; Zbl 07109943) Full Text: DOI
Hart, Sergiu; Nisan, Noam Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity. (English) Zbl 1422.91307 J. Econ. Theory 183, 991-1029 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B24 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Hart} and \textit{N. Nisan}, J. Econ. Theory 183, 991--1029 (2019; Zbl 1422.91307) Full Text: DOI
Eden, Alon; Feldman, Michal; Vardi, Adi Online random sampling for budgeted settings. (English) Zbl 1422.91301 Theory Comput. Syst. 63, No. 7, 1470-1498 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Eden} et al., Theory Comput. Syst. 63, No. 7, 1470--1498 (2019; Zbl 1422.91301) Full Text: DOI
Mailath, George J. Modeling strategic behavior. A graduate introduction to game theory and mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1435.91002 World Scientific Lecture Notes in Economics and Policy 6. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific (ISBN 978-981-323-993-7/hbk; 978-981-12-0076-2/pbk; 978-981-323-995-1/ebook). xii, 351 p. (2019). Reviewer: Agnieszka Rusinowska (Paris) MSC: 91-01 91A40 91B03 91A18 91B26 91A28 91A11 91A20 91A25 91B43 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. J. Mailath}, Modeling strategic behavior. A graduate introduction to game theory and mechanism design. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific (2019; Zbl 1435.91002) Full Text: DOI
Koessler, Frédéric; Skreta, Vasiliki Selling with evidence. (English) Zbl 1422.91311 Theor. Econ. 14, No. 2, 345-371 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B32 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Koessler} and \textit{V. Skreta}, Theor. Econ. 14, No. 2, 345--371 (2019; Zbl 1422.91311) Full Text: DOI
Xu, Minbo; Yin, Nina; Li, Sanxi Multitask assignments with adverse selection. (English) Zbl 1418.91281 Econ. Lett. 181, 127-132 (2019). MSC: 91B40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Xu} et al., Econ. Lett. 181, 127--132 (2019; Zbl 1418.91281) Full Text: DOI
Holler, Manfred J.; Illing, Gerhard; Napel, Stefan Introduction to game theory. 8th edition. (Einführung in die Spieltheorie.) (German) Zbl 1422.91003 Lehrbuch. Berlin: Springer Gabler (ISBN 978-3-642-31962-4/pbk; 978-3-642-31963-1/ebook). xiii, 478 p. (2019). MSC: 91-01 91A10 91A12 91A25 91A22 91A15 91A40 91B54 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. J. Holler} et al., Einführung in die Spieltheorie. 8th edition. Berlin: Springer Gabler (2019; Zbl 1422.91003) Full Text: DOI
Dur, Umut Mert; Wiseman, Thomas School choice with neighbors. (English) Zbl 1417.91381 J. Math. Econ. 83, 101-109 (2019). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{U. M. Dur} and \textit{T. Wiseman}, J. Math. Econ. 83, 101--109 (2019; Zbl 1417.91381) Full Text: DOI
Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments. (English) Zbl 1417.91243 J. Math. Econ. 82, 214-226 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. M. Manelli} and \textit{D. R. Vincent}, J. Math. Econ. 82, 214--226 (2019; Zbl 1417.91243) Full Text: DOI
Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition. (English) Zbl 1417.91252 J. Math. Econ. 82, 202-213 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Schweizer} and \textit{N. Szech}, J. Math. Econ. 82, 202--213 (2019; Zbl 1417.91252) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Zhou; Cheng, Yukun; Deng, Xiaotie; Qi, Qi; Yan, Xiang Agent incentives of strategic behavior in resource exchange. (English) Zbl 1422.91385 Discrete Appl. Math. 264, 15-25 (2019). MSC: 91B32 91A40 90C27 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Chen} et al., Discrete Appl. Math. 264, 15--25 (2019; Zbl 1422.91385) Full Text: DOI
Li, Yunan Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition. (English) Zbl 1410.91249 J. Econ. Theory 182, 279-328 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Li}, J. Econ. Theory 182, 279--328 (2019; Zbl 1410.91249) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Zhou; Cheng, Yukun; Qi, Qi; Yan, Xiang Agent incentives of a proportional sharing mechanism in resource sharing. (English) Zbl 1423.90217 J. Comb. Optim. 37, No. 2, 639-667 (2019). MSC: 90C27 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Chen} et al., J. Comb. Optim. 37, No. 2, 639--667 (2019; Zbl 1423.90217) Full Text: DOI
Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S. Matthew Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1419.91332 Games Econ. Behav. 113, 97-115 (2019). MSC: 91B26 93E20 05B35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Kleinberg} and \textit{S. M. Weinberg}, Games Econ. Behav. 113, 97--115 (2019; Zbl 1419.91332) Full Text: DOI
Vöcking, Berthold A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions. (English) Zbl 1419.91343 Games Econ. Behav. 113, 4-16 (2019). MSC: 91B26 68W20 68W25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Vöcking}, Games Econ. Behav. 113, 4--16 (2019; Zbl 1419.91343) Full Text: DOI
Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew Ignorance and uncertainty. (English) Zbl 1422.91016 Econometric Society Monographs 61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (ISBN 978-1-108-42202-4/hbk; 978-1-108-43449-2/pbk; 978-1-108-37999-1/ebook). xiv, 287 p. (2019). MSC: 91-02 91B06 91B26 91A40 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Compte} and \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Ignorance and uncertainty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2019; Zbl 1422.91016) Full Text: DOI
Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Budish, Eric Strategy-proofness in the large. (English) Zbl 1409.91115 Rev. Econ. Stud. 86, No. 1, 81-116 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. M. Azevedo} and \textit{E. Budish}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 86, No. 1, 81--116 (2019; Zbl 1409.91115) Full Text: DOI
Grimm, Veronika; Kleinert, Thomas; Liers, Frauke; Schmidt, Martin; Zöttl, Gregor Optimal price zones of electricity markets: a mixed-integer multilevel model and global solution approaches. (English) Zbl 1407.90077 Optim. Methods Softw. 34, No. 2, 406-436 (2019). MSC: 90B10 91B26 90C11 90C35 90C90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Grimm} et al., Optim. Methods Softw. 34, No. 2, 406--436 (2019; Zbl 1407.90077) Full Text: DOI
Bhat, Satyanath; Jain, Shweta; Gujar, Sujit; Narahari, Y. An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement. (English) Zbl 1419.91311 Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 85, No. 1, 1-19 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B69 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bhat} et al., Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 85, No. 1, 1--19 (2019; Zbl 1419.91311) Full Text: DOI
Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun; Wagener, Andreas Multiple prizes in research tournaments. (English) Zbl 1406.91179 Econ. Lett. 175, 118-120 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Hoppe-Wewetzer} and \textit{A. Wagener}, Econ. Lett. 175, 118--120 (2019; Zbl 1406.91179) Full Text: DOI
Anari, Nima; Goel, Gagan; Nikzad, Afshin Budget feasible procurement auctions. (English) Zbl 1455.91112 Oper. Res. 66, No. 3, 637-652 (2018). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Anari} et al., Oper. Res. 66, No. 3, 637--652 (2018; Zbl 1455.91112) Full Text: DOI
Qin, Rui; Yuan, Yong; Wang, Fei-Yue A Pareto optimal mechanism for demand-side platforms in real time bidding advertising markets. (English) Zbl 1448.90057 Inf. Sci. 469, 119-140 (2018). MSC: 90B60 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Qin} et al., Inf. Sci. 469, 119--140 (2018; Zbl 1448.90057) Full Text: DOI
Nikolova, Evdokia; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yang, Ger Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents. (English) Zbl 1443.91096 Christodoulou, George (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 14th international conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15–17, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 375-392 (2018). MSC: 91B03 91B26 91B16 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Nikolova} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 375--392 (2018; Zbl 1443.91096) Full Text: DOI
Jalaly Khalilabadi, Pooya; Tardos, Éva Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations. (English) Zbl 1437.91129 Christodoulou, George (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 14th international conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15–17, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 246-263 (2018). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Jalaly Khalilabadi} and \textit{É. Tardos}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 246--263 (2018; Zbl 1437.91129) Full Text: DOI
Cheng, Yu; Gravin, Nick; Munagala, Kamesh; Wang, Kangning A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer. (English) Zbl 1443.91090 Christodoulou, George (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 14th international conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15–17, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 96-110 (2018). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Cheng} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 96--110 (2018; Zbl 1443.91090) Full Text: DOI
Ban, Amir Strategy-proof incentives for predictions. (English) Zbl 1443.91089 Christodoulou, George (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 14th international conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15–17, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 51-65 (2018). MSC: 91B03 60G25 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Ban}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11316, 51--65 (2018; Zbl 1443.91089) Full Text: DOI
Kargar, Kamyar; Bayrak, Halil Ibrahim; Pinar, Mustafa Çelebi Robust bilateral trade with discrete types. (English) Zbl 1409.90108 EURO J. Comput. Optim. 6, No. 4, 367-393 (2018). MSC: 90C05 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{K. Kargar} et al., EURO J. Comput. Optim. 6, No. 4, 367--393 (2018; Zbl 1409.90108) Full Text: DOI
Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars A. A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game. (English) Zbl 1419.91020 Theor. Econ. 13, No. 3, 1151-1189 (2018). MSC: 91A10 91B40 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Martimort} et al., Theor. Econ. 13, No. 3, 1151--1189 (2018; Zbl 1419.91020) Full Text: DOI
Kojima, Fuhito; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis. (English) Zbl 1419.91531 J. Econ. Theory 176, 803-833 (2018). MSC: 91B68 90C27 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Kojima} et al., J. Econ. Theory 176, 803--833 (2018; Zbl 1419.91531) Full Text: DOI
Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku; Yılmaz, Özgür How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange. (English) Zbl 1419.91537 J. Econ. Theory 176, 193-231 (2018). MSC: 91B68 92C50 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Sönmez} et al., J. Econ. Theory 176, 193--231 (2018; Zbl 1419.91537) Full Text: DOI
Kadam, Sangram V.; Kotowski, Maciej H. Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets. (English) Zbl 1419.91528 Games Econ. Behav. 112, 1-20 (2018). MSC: 91B68 91A12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. V. Kadam} and \textit{M. H. Kotowski}, Games Econ. Behav. 112, 1--20 (2018; Zbl 1419.91528) Full Text: DOI
Sultanum, Bruno Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets. (English) Zbl 1417.91253 J. Econ. Theory 177, 616-658 (2018). MSC: 91B26 91A25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Sultanum}, J. Econ. Theory 177, 616--658 (2018; Zbl 1417.91253) Full Text: DOI
Carrasco, Vinicius; Farinha Luz, Vitor; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias; Monteiro, Paulo; Moreira, Humberto Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions. (English) Zbl 1417.91229 J. Econ. Theory 177, 245-279 (2018). MSC: 91B26 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Carrasco} et al., J. Econ. Theory 177, 245--279 (2018; Zbl 1417.91229) Full Text: DOI
Mercier, Jean-François Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach. (English) Zbl 1417.91244 Int. J. Game Theory 47, No. 3, 927-947 (2018). MSC: 91B26 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-F. Mercier}, Int. J. Game Theory 47, No. 3, 927--947 (2018; Zbl 1417.91244) Full Text: DOI
Li, Zhize; Zhang, Le; Fang, Zhixuan; Li, Jian A two-stage mechanism for ordinal peer assessment. (English) Zbl 1415.91144 Deng, Xiaotie (ed.), Algorithmic game theory. 11th international symposium, SAGT 2018, Beijing, China, September 11–14, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 176-188 (2018). MSC: 91B26 68W40 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Li} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 176--188 (2018; Zbl 1415.91144) Full Text: DOI
Feldman, Moran; Gonen, Rica Removal and threshold pricing: truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants. (English) Zbl 1415.91138 Deng, Xiaotie (ed.), Algorithmic game theory. 11th international symposium, SAGT 2018, Beijing, China, September 11–14, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 163-175 (2018). MSC: 91B26 90B60 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Feldman} and \textit{R. Gonen}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 163--175 (2018; Zbl 1415.91138) Full Text: DOI
Greenwald, Amy; Oyakawa, Takehiro; Syrgkanis, Vasilis On revenue-maximizing mechanisms assuming convex costs. (English) Zbl 1415.91140 Deng, Xiaotie (ed.), Algorithmic game theory. 11th international symposium, SAGT 2018, Beijing, China, September 11–14, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 113-124 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Greenwald} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 113--124 (2018; Zbl 1415.91140) Full Text: DOI
Yao, Andrew Chi-chih On revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions. (English) Zbl 1415.91146 Deng, Xiaotie (ed.), Algorithmic game theory. 11th international symposium, SAGT 2018, Beijing, China, September 11–14, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 1-11 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. C. c. Yao}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11059, 1--11 (2018; Zbl 1415.91146) Full Text: DOI
Leucci, Stefano; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Penna, Paolo No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems. (English) Zbl 1416.91137 Games Econ. Behav. 111, 64-74 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Leucci} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 111, 64--74 (2018; Zbl 1416.91137) Full Text: DOI
Bichler, Martin; Paulsen, Per A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions. (English) Zbl 1416.91129 Games Econ. Behav. 111, 20-40 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Bichler} and \textit{P. Paulsen}, Games Econ. Behav. 111, 20--40 (2018; Zbl 1416.91129) Full Text: DOI
Arozamena, Leandro; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions. (English) Zbl 1397.91239 Econ. Lett. 171, 115-118 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Arozamena} et al., Econ. Lett. 171, 115--118 (2018; Zbl 1397.91239) Full Text: DOI
Gatti, N.; Rocco, M.; Serafino, P.; Ventre, C. Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions. (English) Zbl 1418.91220 Theor. Comput. Sci. 745, 150-162 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Gatti} et al., Theor. Comput. Sci. 745, 150--162 (2018; Zbl 1418.91220) Full Text: DOI
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio Inefficient rushes in auctions. (English) Zbl 1396.91253 Theor. Econ. 13, No. 1, 273-306 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Á. Hernando-Veciana} and \textit{F. Michelucci}, Theor. Econ. 13, No. 1, 273--306 (2018; Zbl 1396.91253) Full Text: DOI
Kotowski, Maciej H. On asymmetric reserve prices. (English) Zbl 1396.91259 Theor. Econ. 13, No. 1, 205-237 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. H. Kotowski}, Theor. Econ. 13, No. 1, 205--237 (2018; Zbl 1396.91259) Full Text: DOI
Fotakis, Dimitris; Krysta, Piotr; Ventre, Carmine The power of verification for greedy mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1452.91071 J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 62, 459-488 (2018). MSC: 91B03 68W99 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Fotakis} et al., J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 62, 459--488 (2018; Zbl 1452.91071) Full Text: DOI
Mu’alem, Ahuva; Schapira, Michael Setting lower bounds on truthfulness. (English) Zbl 1400.91228 Games Econ. Behav. 110, 174-193 (2018). MSC: 91B26 62F15 90B35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Mu'alem} and \textit{M. Schapira}, Games Econ. Behav. 110, 174--193 (2018; Zbl 1400.91228) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Xi; Diakonikolas, Ilias; Paparas, Dimitris; Sun, Xiaorui; Yannakakis, Mihalis The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer. (English) Zbl 1400.91214 Games Econ. Behav. 110, 139-164 (2018). MSC: 91B26 68Q17 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{X. Chen} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 110, 139--164 (2018; Zbl 1400.91214) Full Text: DOI
Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan; Figueroa, Nicolás Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide. (English) Zbl 1396.91142 Math. Soc. Sci. 91, 56-61 (2018). MSC: 91B14 91B26 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Caffera} et al., Math. Soc. Sci. 91, 56--61 (2018; Zbl 1396.91142) Full Text: DOI
Giannakopoulos, Yiannis; Koutsoupias, Elias Selling two goods optimally. (English) Zbl 1396.91247 Inf. Comput. 261, Part 2, 432-445 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Giannakopoulos} and \textit{E. Koutsoupias}, Inf. Comput. 261, Part 2, 432--445 (2018; Zbl 1396.91247) Full Text: DOI