

Taylor, Alan; Zwicker, William**Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power.** (English) Zbl 0765.90030
Games Econ. Behav. 5, No. 1, 170-181 (1993).

Summary: A simple game (P, W) can serve as a model of a voting system in which an alternative is pitted against the status quo. In what follows, we investigate the following three aspects of such games as they apply to four real-world examples of voting systems: a characterization of weighted voting systems in terms of the ways in which coalitions can gain or lose by trading players; the application of a graph-theoretic notion of dimension to simple games and voting systems; and the consideration of a way to measure the power of a player as an interval of real numbers.

MSC:

91B12 Voting theory
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
91F10 History, political science

Cited in **1** Review
Cited in **38** Documents**Keywords:**

simple game; voting system; power of a player

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