

Materna, Pavel

Quine's criticism of the "first dogma of empiricism". (English) [Zbl 1117.03013](#)
Log. Log. Philos. 13, 5-30 (2004).

Introduction: Quine's conclusion concerning the possibility of a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements [see *W. V. O. Quine*, "Two dogmas of empiricism", in: *From a logical point of view. Logico-philosophical essays*. Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass. (1953; [Zbl 0050.00501](#))] is:

"[a] boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith."

Quine defended this conclusion consistently during all his scientific life [see, e.g., *W. V. O. Quine*, *Pursuit of truth*. Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass. (1990; [Zbl 0733.03002](#))]. Yet the most concise and thorough argumentation can be found just in "Two dogmas of empiricism". I briefly recapitulate this argumentation and show that a necessary premise is missing. Then I try to demonstrate that this premise is unjustified, and show a way how to discover the meaning of a given expression.

MSC:

[03A05](#) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations

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