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Game analysis of information-based manipulation of securities market. (Chinese. English summary) [Zbl 1180.91062](#)

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Summary: An existing model available in literature is modified to degrade the accuracy of private information from an informer, so that he can manipulate the securities market repeatedly in a long period. The analysis result shows that, the informer has to make the public believe in his honesty to lead the public's believes in the assets and manipulate the market. The long-period equilibrium of an informer who may change his statuses between honesty and dishonesty is that it is impossible for the public to fully know his status, information transfer keeps on and his creditability is more than $1/2$.

MSC:

[91A40](#) Other game-theoretic models

[91B44](#) Economics of information

Cited in **1** Document

Keywords:

market manipulation; securities market; game model; informer