an:01310146
Zbl 0941.91034
Chakraborty, Indranil
Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
EN
Econ. Theory 13, No. 3, 723-733 (1999).
00055149
1999
j
91B26
auctions; bundling
Summary: Auctioneers often face the decision of whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction (or any other revenue equivalent auction form) there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that critical number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated for a given bidder. The results have been proved using a mathematical technique of quantiles that can be extremely useful for similar analysis.