an:05032911
Zbl 1141.91412
Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
Optimal auction with resale
EN
Econometrica 70, No. 6, 2197-2224 (2002).
00125656
2002
j
91B26 91A40
Summary: This paper investigates the design of seller-optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good. In that case, the optimal allocation characterized by \textit{R. B. Myerson} [Math. Oper. Res. 6, 58--73 (1981; Zbl 0496.90099)] cannot be achieved without resale. I find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale. In two-bidder cases, I prove that the Myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions. With three or more bidders, achieving the Myerson allocation is more difficult. I prove that it can be implemented in special cases. In those cases, the Myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions, each optimally chosen by a reseller.
Zbl 0496.90099