Bade, Sophie Dynamic semi-consistency. (English) Zbl 1497.91079 Games Econ. Behav. 134, 117-126 (2022). Summary: Semi-consistent conditional preferences are inconsistent enough for different ambiguity attitudes to manifest themselves in different behavior and consistent enough for information to be generically valuable. To simultaneously achieve these two desiderata I assume exactly one type of dynamic inconsistency: agents do not update their preferences upon learning independent randomization outcomes. MSC: 91B06 Decision theory 91A27 Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games Keywords:ambiguity aversion; dynamic consistency; games with incomplete information × Cite Format Result Cite Review PDF Full Text: DOI References: [1] Anscombe, F.; Aumann, R., A definition of subjective probability, Ann. Math. Stat., 34, 199-205, 1963 · Zbl 0114.07204 [2] Azrieli, Y.; Teper, R., Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information, Games Econ. 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