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Modeling political and economic relations between Norway and Russia: a behavioral game theory approach. (English) Zbl 1497.91064

Summary: From the past until now, political and economic relations among countries have been one of the most important issues among analysts and numerous studies have tried to analyze these relations from different theoretical perspectives. The of games has introduced a new modeling method in the . In this study, we use behavioral models (level-\(k\)) along with the dynamic system in games to model rational agent behavior. As an application, we study Russia-Norway economic and political relations (1970–2019). The dynamic system in games along with behavioral games theory can be used to predict the players behavior in the future.

MSC:

91A80 Applications of game theory
91A25 Dynamic games
91F10 History, political science
91B60 Trade models
Full Text: DOI

References:

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